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Series Introduction 
This China Maritime Report on Djibouti is the first in a series of case studies on China’s “overseas 
strategic strongpoints” (海外战略支点). The strategic strongpoint concept has no formal definition, 
but is used by People’s Republic of China (PRC) officials and analysts to describe foreign ports with 
special strategic and economic value that host terminals and commercial zones operated by Chinese 
firms.1 Each case study examines the characteristics and functions of port projects developed and 
operated by Chinese companies across the Indian Ocean region.2 The distinctive features of these 
projects are: (1) their strategic locations, positioned astride major sea lines of communication 
(SLOCs) and clustered near vital maritime chokepoints; (2) the comprehensive nature of Chinese 
investments and operations, involving coordination among state-owned enterprises and private firms 
to construct not only the port, but rail, road, and pipeline infrastructure, and further, to promote 
finance, trade, industry, and resource extraction in inland markets; and (3) their fused civilian and 
military functions, serving as platforms for economic, military, and diplomatic interactions. 
Strategic strongpoints advance a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) leadership objective to become a 
“strong maritime power”3 (海洋强国)—which requires, inter alia, the development of a strong 
marine economy and the capability to protect “Chinese rights and interests” in the maritime domain.4 
With the notable exception of the sole overseas People’s Liberation Army (PLA) base at Djibouti, all 
of the facilities examined in this series are ostensibly commercial. Even the Chinese presence in 
Djibouti has some major commercial motivations (addressed in detail in this study). However, 
China’s strategic strongpoint model integrates China’s various commercial and strategic interests, 
facilitating Chinese trade and investment with the host country while also helping the PLA establish 
a network of supply, logistics, and intelligence hubs across the Indian Ocean and beyond. 
  
 
1 For an overview of this concept, see Conor Kennedy, “Strategic Strongpoints and Chinese Naval Strategy.” Jamestown 
Foundation China Brief 19, no. 6 (March 22, 2019), https://jamestown.org/program/strategic-strong-points-and-chinese-
naval-strategy/.  
2 Currently planned case studies include Gwadar in Pakistan, Colombo and Hambantota in Sri Lanka, and Kyaukpyu in 
Myanmar. None of these other commercial port projects has any PLA military facilities to date, but Chinese analysts 
discuss each as a potential strategic strongpoint. 
3 This objective is enshrined in the 18th and 19th CCP National Party Congress reports (2012, 2017), as well as the PRC’s 
13th “Five-Year Plan” for Economic Development (2016). See: 胡锦涛在中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会上的报告 
[“Hu Jintao's Report to the 18th Party Congress”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], November 8, 2012, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n/2012/1118/c64094-19612151.html; 习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会上的报告 
[“Xi Jinping's Report to the 19th Party Congress”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], October 28, 2017, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1028/c64094-29613660.html; 中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规
划纲要 [“Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for PRC Economic and Social Development”], 新华社 [Xinhua], March 17, 
2016, http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016lh/2016-03/17/c_1118366322_11.htm. 
4 习近平在中共中央政治局第八次集体学习时强调：进一步关心海洋认识海洋经略海洋 推动海洋强国建设不断取
得新成就 [“Xi Jinping at the Central Committee Politburo Eighth Study Group, Take a Step Toward Considering 
Maritime Consciousness, Maritime Strategic Management, Promote the Construction of Maritime Power, Constantly 
Reaching New Achievements”], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], July 31, 2013, 
http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0801/c1024-22401311.html. 
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Summary 
This report analyzes PRC economic and military interests and activities in Djibouti. The small, east 
African nation is the site of the PLA’s first overseas military base, but also serves as a major 
commercial hub for Chinese firms—especially in the transport and logistics industry. We explain the 
synthesis of China’s commercial and strategic goals in Djibouti through detailed examination of the 
development and operations of commercial ports and related infrastructure. Employing the “Shekou 
Model” of comprehensive port zone development, Chinese firms have flocked to Djibouti with the 
intention of transforming it into a gateway to the markets and resources of Africa—especially 
landlocked Ethiopia—and a transport hub for trade between Europe and Asia. With diplomatic and 
financial support from Beijing, PRC firms have established a China-friendly business ecosystem and 
a political environment that proved conducive to the establishment of a permanent military presence. 
The Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission that justified the original PLA deployment in the region is now 
only one of several missions assigned to Chinese armed forces at Djibouti, a contingent that includes 
marines and special forces. The PLA is broadly responsible for the security of China’s “overseas 
interests,” for which Djibouti provides essential logistical support. China’s first overseas strategic 
strongpoint at Djibouti is a secure commercial foothold on the African continent and a military 
platform for expanding PLA operations in the Indian Ocean and beyond.  
Introduction: A Foothold in the Western Indian Ocean 
 
Image 1. Major Indian Ocean Shipping Lanes5 
China’s most important SLOCs run from the mainland across the South China Sea, through the 
Malacca Strait, and across the east-west trunk route of the Indian Ocean. Passing into the western 
 
5 Source: MarineTraffic vessel density 2016-2017, showing tanker and cargo vessels over 75,000 tons gross tonnage.  
 3 
Indian Ocean, China’s “maritime lifeline” (海上生命线) splits in two.6 One route heads northwest 
through the Strait of Hormuz and into the Persian Gulf, the source of some 40 percent of China’s 
imported oil;7 the other continues westward to the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, with Djibouti at its 
entrance—and beyond it, the Red Sea, Suez Canal, and major markets of the Mediterranean and 
Europe. With rising demands on the PLA to “protect the security of China’s overseas interests,”8 
especially these vital SLOCs and chokepoints, the requirement to sustain out-of-area operations has 
made some form of foreign basing posture virtually inevitable. 
China is steadily enhancing its ability to project power and secure the western end of this lifeline. 
Since it began regularized, U.N.-sanctioned anti-piracy escort task forces deployed to the Gulf of 
Aden in December 2008,9 the PLA Navy (PLAN) has developed experience in conducting and 
sustaining limited operations in the “far seas.”10 Not long after Japan established its first overseas 
facility in Djibouti in 2011 (joining the U.S., France, and Italy as military tenants of the tiny, former 
French colony on the Horn of Africa), China seized the opportunity to augment its own presence.11 
Beginning in 2012, with construction of a commercial port in partnership with the government of 
Djibouti, and culminating in the development of a military base adjacent to it, China developed its 
“first overseas strategic strongpoint” in Djibouti.12  
While the circumstances that led to the establishment of a formal, dedicated military base at Djibouti 
are unlikely to be replicated at other sites, that base should be considered as one critical node in an 
emerging network of overseas port facilities that serve both strategic and commercial purposes.13 As 
a lone base unsupported by other Chinese bases or allies, Djibouti does not yet offer the PLA 
 
6 This is a common designation for this critical SLOC in Chinese strategic writing. See, for example, 肖晞 [Xiao Xi], 中国
国家安全面临的挑战与战略选择 [“China’s National Security Challenges and Strategic Choices”], 薄贵利, 主编 [Bao 
Guili, ed.], 强国宏略: 国家战略前沿问题研究 [Grand Strategies for Strengthening the Nation: Research on the 
Forefront Issues of National Strategy] (Beijing: People’s Press, 2016), p. 505; 胡冬英, 黄锐, 蔡广友 [Hu Dongying, 
Huang Rui, and Cai Guangyou], 推进潜艇兵力走向远洋的几点思考 [“Several Thoughts on Advancing the Submarine 
Force to Distant Oceans”], 舰船电子工程 [Ship Electronic Engineering], no. 1 (2017), p. 2. 
7 Tim Gould, Tae-Yoon Kim, “The world can’t afford to relax about oil security,” International Energy Agency, 
September 19, 2019, https://www.iea.org/commentaries/the-world-cant-afford-to-relax-about-oil-security 
8 “Protecting the security overseas interests” (保护海外利益安全) is one of eight “strategic tasks” (战略任务) outlined in 
the 2015 PLA White Paper. See PRC State Council Information Office, “China’s Military Strategy,” May 27, 2015, 
http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm 
9 十年, 中国海军护航编队执行护航任务 1190批次 [“In Ten Years, the Chinese Naval Escort Task Forces has Carried 
Out 1,190 Escort Missions”], 人民网 [People’s Daily Online], December 24, 2018, 
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1224/c1011-30484891.html. 
10 See Andrew S. Erickson, Austin M. Strange, “No Substitute for Experience,” CMSI Red Book, no. 10 (2013), 
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cmsi-red-books/12/ 
11 Vice Admiral (ret.) Michael Franken, then in command of the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa, recounts that 
the PRC Ambassador to Djibouti and PRC defense attaché to Ethiopia approached him at a social event in late 2011 and 
requested a visit to the U.S. military base at Camp Lemonnier, where they hoped to tour the facility and discuss how the 
United States had helped Japan establish its military presence in Djibouti (Author interview with Franken, March 2020); 
Alex Martin, “First Overseas Military Base Since WWII to Open in Djibouti,” The Japan Times, July 2, 2011, 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2011/07/02/national/first-overseas-military-base-since-wwii-to-open-in-
djibouti/#.XmlonqhKiUk. 
12 刘琳 [Liu Lin], ‘一带一路’ 沿线战略支点与军事外交建设 [“Strategic Strongpoints Along the ‘Belt And Road’ and 
Building Military Diplomacy”], 世界知识 [World Knowledge], July 26, 2017, http://m.dunjiaodu.com/waijiao/1562.html. 
13 For a detailed discussion of the establishment of the facility, see Erica Downs, Jeffrey Becker, and Patrick DeGategno, 
“China’s Military Support Facility in Djibouti: The Economic and Security Dimensions of China’s First Overseas Base,” 
Center for Naval Analyses, July 2017, https://apps.dtic.mil/docs/citations/AD1038215. 
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significant wartime capability.14 Instead, it serves largely as a supply, logistics, and intelligence hub 
for increasingly complex peacetime military operations across China’s Indian Ocean lifeline, now 
anchored in the east by China’s cluster of artificial island bases in the South China Sea.15 The PLA 
Academy of Military Science’s authoritative 2013 Science of Military Strategy advocated for such a 
pattern: 
[W]e must build overseas strategic strongpoints that depend on the homeland, radiate into the 
surrounding areas, and move toward the two oceans [i.e., the Pacific and Indian Oceans]. 
[Each strongpoint] will provide support for overseas military operations or act as a forward 
base for deploying military forces overseas, exerting political and military influence in 
relevant regions, and forming a posture with the homeland strategic layout that accounts for 
both the interior and the exterior, links the near with the far, and mutually supports the 
other.16  
Chinese officials and analysts are quick to distinguish PRC “strategic strongpoints” from traditional 
military bases, contrasting a benign PLA overseas presence with the bases owned by other 
countries—especially the “hegemonic” system of U.S. military bases on foreign soil.17 According to 
Chinese officials, the Djibouti “support base” (保障基地) is intended to “fulfill international 
obligations,” by providing humanitarian relief, supporting Chinese peacekeeping in Africa, assisting 
ongoing anti-piracy missions, and “maintaining peace and stability in Africa and the world.”18  
 
14 A leading Chinese maritime strategist offered the analogy of Imperial Germany’s naval base at Qingdao, which was also 
isolated and thus quickly seized by Japan and the United Kingdom in World War I (Author discussion with Hu Bo, 
Director of the Centre for Maritime Strategy Studies at Peking University, February 2019). Section V below offers a fuller 
assessment of the military capability provided by the base. 
15 侯昂好 [Hou Anghao], 超越马汉: 关于中国未来海权道路发展的思考 [“Beyond Mahan: Thoughts on the Future 
Development Path of Chinese Seapower”], 国防 [National Defense], no. 3 (2017), pp. 45-54; 陈贞国 [Chen Zhenguo], 三
沙: 打造海上丝路战略支点 ["Sansha, Creating a Maritime Silk Road Strategic Strongpoint”], 世界知识 [World Affairs], 
no. 12 (2016), pp. 52-53. 
15 郑崇伟, 高成志, 张仲, 孔洁, 万勇 [Zheng Chongwei, Gao Chengzhi, Zhang Zhong, Kong Jie, Wan Yong], 岛礁跑道
设计中的风候特征分析 [“Wind Climate Analysis Under the Demand of Reef Runway Construction”], 海洋预报 
[Marine Forecasts] 34, no. 4 (August 2017), pp. 52-57; Zheng Chongwei, et al.,经略 21世纪海上丝绸之路’: 综合应用
平台建设 [“The Strategy of Maritime Silk Road in the 21st Century: Construction of Integrated Application Platform”], 海
洋开发与管理 [Ocean Development and Management], no. 2 (2017), pp. 52-57.  
16寿晓松 [Shou Xiaosong], ed., 战略学 [Science of Military Strategy], (Beijing: Military Science Publishing, 2013), p. 
254. 
17 According to several well-placed Chinese analysts, “the Chinese government is very cautious in representing its 
strategic strongpoints, and takes pains to distinguish them from American bases overseas, stressing that as a prerequisite 
they do not threaten the security and sovereignty of the port country, building only necessary security and defense 
capabilities, building strategic strongpoints at key areas, coordinating the construction of a regional security system, and 
ensuring the smooth and secure trade between the host country and China. This is the necessary national security 
connection for overseas-invested Chinese firms, although this goal is still a long-term one.” 国观智库政策研究中心“一
带一路”课题组 [Grandview Think Tank “Belt and Road” Research Group], “一带一路”中国海外港口项目战略分析报
告 [“‘One Belt One Road’ Chinese Overseas Port Projects Strategic Analytical Report”], 国观智库[Grandview 
Institution], (2019), p. 3. See also 吴敏文 [Wu Minwen], 大国海外军事基地地图 [Map of Great Powers’ Overseas 
Military Bases”], 新华网 [Xinhua Net], June 6, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/globe/2018-06/06/c_137212406.htm. 
18 国防部谈中国驻吉布提保障基地:为了更好履行国际义务 [“Ministry of Defense talks about China’s Support Base in 
Djibouti: In Order to Better Fulfill International Obligations”], 人民日报 (People’s Daily), November 30, 2018, 
http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2018/1130/c1011-30434450.html; 吉布提军事基地是海外扩张第一步？ 外交部回应 
 [“Is the Djibouti military base the first step in overseas expansion? The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Responds”], PRC 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, July 13, 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/chn/zfgx/zfgxdfzc/t1477374.htm. The facility is 
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Benign or not, the emerging PLA support system overseas is unlikely to mirror America’s. Instead, it 
will follow the PRC’s commercial presence to support its expanding portfolio of military missions. 
PLAN Commander Admiral Wu Shengli described this process even as the base in Djibouti was 
being built. At a navy seminar held on the eighth anniversary of the Gulf of Aden anti-piracy mission 
(December 2016), he explained “overseas strategic strongpoint construction provides a new support 
for escort operations…. [W]e must give full play to the supporting role of the overseas support 
system to carry out larger scale missions in broader areas and to shape the situation.”19  
This report examines the development of this “overseas support system,” tracking China’s broader 
efforts to “shape the situation” by establishing a robust overseas commercial, diplomatic, and 
military presence in Djibouti. While the military base appropriately attracts the lion’s share of foreign 
scrutiny, it cannot be understood without examining the role of the Chinese firms that preceded it. By 
building and operating the necessary infrastructure—both physical and diplomatic—these firms 
established the PRC’s position in Djibouti and paved the way for a major Chinese strategic footprint 
in Africa. 
Section one introduces Djibouti’s strategic geography and the Chinese “Shekou Model” of 
comprehensive development of trade and industry at port sites. Section two describes the 
characteristics of the Chinese-operated port and free trade zone at Djibouti. Section three takes stock 
of the transport infrastructure built to service the port and expand its economic and strategic impact. 
Section four analyzes the inland markets and resources that this transport network intends to access. 
Section five assesses the functions and capabilities of the new Chinese military base in Djibouti. The 
case study provides a detailed examination of Chinese military and commercial operations at 
Djibouti and provides a template for future analysis of other potential “overseas strategic 
strongpoints.”  
A New “Shekou” in Djibouti 
Chinese firms see Djibouti as a major transshipment hub and a key to unlocking the economies of the 
Horn of Africa—most notably, landlocked Ethiopia. The managing director of the leading Chinese 
firm in Djibouti, China Merchants Port Holdings Company Ltd. (CMPort), explains this vision, 
noting that Djibouti “is very close to the major Asia-Europe shipping route and is an important 
gateway port for the hinterland countries within the region.”20 Together with the China Export Import 
Bank (Exim Bank), CMPort and its parent company, the central state-owned enterprise (SOE) China 
Merchants Group (CMG),21 have established a platform of finance, infrastructure, and trade that 
enables many Chinese firms to pursue business in a once unappealing economic environment.22  
 
sometimes called a “logistics and supply base” (后勤补给基地), a “support base” (保障基地), or simply a “military base” 
(军事基地). 
19 梁庆松, 王元元 [Liang Qingsong, Wang Yuanyuan], 海军召开亚丁湾护航 8周年研讨会 [“The Navy Holds a 
Seminar on the 8th Anniversary of the Gulf of Aden Escorts”], 人民海军 [People’s Navy], December 30, 2016, p. 1. 
20 Julien Wagner and Oliver Caslin, “‘Investment is not limited to ports’: Jingtao Bai, director general of China Merchants 
Port Holdings,” The Africa Report, March 20, 2019, https://www.theafricareport.com/10475/investment-is-not-limited-to-
ports-jingtao-bai-director-general-of-china-merchants-port-holdings/ 
21 “Central SOEs” are the 95 firms under the direct supervision of the PRC State Council’s State-Owned Assets and 
Administration Commission (SASAC). See PRC State Council, 企业名录 [“Central State-owned Enterprise Directory”], 
November 8, 2019, available at http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588035/n2641579/n2641645/index.html. 
22 Prior to the influx of major investment, there were very few private Chinese businesses operating in Djibouti. The 
Ministry of Commerce’s 2018 guide on investment in Djibouti stated there were only two Chinese restaurants, and a small 
Chinese grocery store for the 2,000 Chinese nationals in country. See 对外投资合作国别(地区)指南 – 吉布提 (2018版) 
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With an estimated $15 billion total Chinese investment in development of the port and its 
hinterlands, China is the largest external commercial player in Djibouti.23 The relatively large PRC 
commercial presence reflects, at least in part, Western absence. Western analysts have repeatedly 
questioned the feasibility of the Djiboutian government’s proposed infrastructure projects,24 and 
expressed concerns about its large government debt load.25 China, by contrast, has not balked at the 
financial risk inherent in investing in Djibouti and has fast become the nation’s principal economic 
partner and creditor.26 Djibouti’s president, Ismail Omar Guelleh, said in April 2017 that, “no one but 
the Chinese offers a long-term partnership in Djibouti.”27 China-Djibouti relations were upgraded to 
a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” when Guelleh visited China in November that year.28  
Djiboutian authorities hope the partnership with the PRC will transform Djibouti into the 
“Singapore” or “Dubai of East Africa.”29 The CMG President touted his firm’s success in 
Guangdong as a “template for development in Djibouti,” where they seek to leverage the 
“transformative power of ports.”30 This transformation entails building transport infrastructure, 
industrial parks, free trade and export processing zones, and developing commercial services and 
residential areas adjacent to the port. CMPort markets this style of comprehensive development as 
the “Shekou Model” (蛇口模式).31 This business model derives its name and inspiration from 
 
[“Guide to Foreign Investment Cooperation by Country (Region) (2018)”], 中华人民共和国商务部 [PRC Ministry of 
Commerce], 2018, p. 3, 6,  http://obor.sh-itc.net/article/fxffnew/gbznnew/201903/1467957_1.html. 
23 “‘One Belt One Road’ Chinese Overseas Port Projects Strategic Analytical Report,” pp. 10-11; “Strengthening Djibouti 
Port’s Strategic Position,” Port de Djibouti, July 4, 2015, http://www.portdedjibouti.com/strengthenin-djibouti-ports-
strategic-position/ 
24 An aspirational Djiboutian government report from 2017 lays out an ambitious aim to become the logistical and 
commercial hub for East Africa. Republique de Djibouti, “Vision Djibouti 2035,” http://www.ccd.dj/w2017/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Vision-Nationale.pdf. 
25 The IMF reported in December 2018 that “The Djiboutian authorities’ strategy of investing in infrastructure to transform 
the economy and position the country as a logistics and commercial hub offers great opportunities for economic growth 
and development. However, the financing of this strategy through a build-up of debt has resulted in debt distress, which 
poses significant risks. Public and publicly guaranteed debt is expected to be around 104 per cent of GDP at end-2018.” 
See: “IMF Staff Concludes the 2018 Article IV Consultation Mission in Djibouti,” IMF Press Release No. 18/486, 
December 19, 2018, https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2018/12/19/pr18486-djibouti-imf-staff-concludes-the-2018-
article-iv-consultation-mission; Monte Reel, “Djibouti Is Hot: How a Forgotten Sandlot of a Country Became a Hub of 
International Power Games,” Bloomberg, March 23, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-djibouti; Mary 
Harper, “Can Ethiopia's Railway Bring Peace to Somalia?” BBC, November 23, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-34871074. 
26 International Monetary Fund, “Djibouti, 2019 Article IV Consultation,” IMF Country Report, No. 19/314, October 
2019, https://www.imf.org/~/media/Files/Publications/CR/2019/1DJIEA2019002.ashx; John Hurley, Scott Morris, and 
Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective,” Center 
for Global Development Policy Paper, no. 121 (March 2018), https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-
implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf. 
27 Francois Soudan, “No One but China Offers a Long-term Partnership in Djibouti: President Guelleh,” TesfaNews, April 
11, 2017, https://www.tesfanews.net/president-guelleh-only-china-offers-long-term-partnership-djibouti/.  
28 Guide to Foreign Investment Cooperation by Country (Region) (2018).  
29 See also Edmund Blair, “China to Start Work Soon on Naval Base in Djibouti—Guelleh,” Reuters, February 2, 2016. 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-djibouti-china- idUKKCN0VB1Z6; Frank Kane, “The Man Who Wants to Make Djibouti 
the Next Dubai,” The National, March 17, 2015, https://www.thenational.ae/business/the-man-who-wants-to-make-
djibouti-the-next-dubai-1.46688 
30 Deng Yanzi, “Building the Shekou of East Africa,” China Daily, March 27, 2017, 
http://www.chinadailyasia.com/asiaweekly/2017-03/27/content_15592240_2.html. 
31 林佳铭, 章强 [Lin Jiaming, Zhang Qiang], 招商局港口‘前港—中区—后城’模式的海外拓展之旅 [“The Overseas 
Expansion of China Merchants Port’s ‘Port in Front–Zone in the Center–City in the Rear’ Model”], 中国港口 [China 
Ports], no. 3 (2019), pp. 25–29. Author interviews with CMPort managers, Hong Kong, June 2019. 
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Shekou, once a tiny fishing village in China’s Guangdong Province. CMG developed a seaport and 
export processing zone there in the early 1980s, propelling neighboring Shenzhen’s growth into a 
world-class commercial, financial, and industrial hub.32 The firm is now promoting this model in the 
small east African nation of Djibouti. The core of this effort is a cluster of ports and associated 
railway, pipeline, and road infrastructure that are designed to “make Djibouti the Shekou of East 
Africa—for regional shipping, logistics, and trade,” in the words of CMG President Li Xiaopeng.33 
This phased development model is also described in shorthand as a “port-park-city” model (前港, 中
区, 后城). This signature CMG approach to port development is designed to facilitate not just the 
transportation of goods, but to foster a wider business ecosystem that supports broader 
development.34 By clustering industrial, logistics, and business service facilities adjacent to the port 
of Djibouti, Chinese firms hope to replicate the extraordinary success of Shenzhen.35 The CMPort 
managing director calls attention to his firm’s “past the pier” development efforts that “are not 
limited to ports but [include an] international free trade zone and urban development called the 
Shekou ‘port-park-city’ comprehensive development model.”36 
 
Djiboutian authorities are enthusiastic about the “innovative model implemented by China 
Merchants” and quite naturally seek the same extraordinary growth.37 Yet Djibouti manifestly lacks 
most of the advantages enjoyed by Shenzhen. The Shekou port complex on Shenzhen’s western 
periphery is nested among the massive population centers of Hong Kong and Guangzhou. It sits in 
the heart of the Pearl River Delta, the commercially vibrant zone at the center of the PRC export 
miracle,38 where it enjoys the benefits of a massive labor pool, productive export-facing industries, 
and growth-oriented, technocratic governance. These benefits are largely unavailable on the Horn of 
Africa. Still, Djibouti is a vital gateway to a large part of the African continent with a rapidly 
expanding population, which may be poised to develop robustly with sound investment and 
economic planning. What Djibouti lacks in terms of pre-existing economic development may be 
partially compensated for by serving as an especially important ocean access hub for the Horn of 
Africa.  
 
32 Deng Yangzi, “CMG Wants to Make African Port of Djibouti ‘New Shekou’,” China Daily, March 7, 2017, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2017-03/07/content_28455386;for detailed discussions of the model and its 
applications, see Lin and Zhang, “The Overseas Expansion of China Merchants Port;” 孔晓青[Kong Xiaoqing], 招商港口
发展“蛇口模式”的形成 [“Formation of the China Merchants Port 'Shekou Model' of Development”], 国家航海 [National 
Navigation], (November 2017, pp. 39-54; 何继江, 刘宁 [He Jijiang, Liu Ning], 蛇口模式:一种社会技术创新 [“Shekou 
Model: A Type of Social Innovation of Technology”], 特区经济 [Special Economic Zone Economies], no. 12 (2014), pp. 
53-57. 
33 Deng Yanzi, “Building the Shekou of East Africa.” 
34 余舒虹 [Yu Shuhong], 招商蛇口：“前港，中区，后城”蛇口模式加快复制 [“China Merchants’ Shekou: ‘Port in 
Front, Industrial Parks in the Middle, City in the Back’ The Shekou Model to be Quickly Replicated”], 经济观察网 
[Economic Observations Net], October 24, 2016, http://www.eeo.com.cn/2016/1024/292959.shtml 
35 Deng Yanzi, “CMG Wants to Make African Port of Djibouti ‘New Shekou’,” China Daily, March 7, 2017, 
https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2017-03/07/content_28455386.htm; Wagner and Caslin, “Investment is not 
limited to ports.” 
36 Wagner and Caslin, “Investment is not limited to ports.” 
37 Aboubaker Omar Hadi, chairman of the Djibouti Port and Free Zone Authority, quoted in 高江虹[Gao Jianghong], “蛇
口模式 4.0” 落地吉布提, 招商局雁形出海 [“‘Shekou Model 4.0’ Arrives in Djibouti, China Merchants ‘Flying Geese’ 
Model Goes Abroad”], 21世界经济报道[21st Century Business Herald], July 5, 2017, 
http://epaper.21jingji.com/html/2017-07/05/content_65726.htm 
38 See Ezra Vogel, One Step Ahead in China: Guangdong Under Reform, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). 
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China’s approach to Djibouti takes advantage of hundreds of other Chinese firms, private and state-
owned, which are clamoring to do business in the growing African market.39 PRC policy fosters and 
advances such overseas investment. CMG, for instance, enjoys substantial backing from Beijing in 
the form of access to a large pool of loan capital from central policy banks (like Exim Bank) and 
local financing,40 including targeted Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) lending from the “Silk Road 
Fund” and other central- and local-government external trade and investment initiatives to promote 
the project.41 Further central support for Chinese firms to build a commercial presence in Africa 
comes through the diplomatic and political boost provided by government programs, particularly the 
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the BRI.42 
 
Li Guofeng, director of the Overseas Business Department of CMG, explained how his firm is 
positioning itself with respect to the BRI, for which the firm’s leadership has been a leading 
proponent:43 
 
[T]he situation in many developing countries along the “Belt and Road” is similar to that in 
Shekou at the beginning of reform and opening up, such as the advantages of low labor costs 
and low land costs. But the reason why companies are unwilling to invest is because the 
infrastructure and soft business environment of many countries is still relatively poor. 
Therefore, China Merchants hopes to provide a platform for Chinese-funded enterprises to 
feel a similar investment environment in China in this region, and to allay their concerns 
about going global.44 
 
This comprehensive approach—in which Chinese financing, expertise, and labor are poured into 
integrated port, infrastructure, and industrial projects—is driven in part by China’s ongoing need to 
shed excess domestic industrial capacity. Vast investment in domestic industry, especially during the 
stimulus following the global financial crisis of 2008, yielded a surplus of labor and capital in several 
 
39 A detailed accounting of Chinese firms’ commercial presence in Africa, including data and analysis on trade, 
investment, and construction contracts, is available on the Johns Hopkins University’s China Africa Research Initiative 
website at http://www.sais-cari.org/other-data. See also Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China 
in Africa, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). 
40 The Belt and Road Initiative has created incentives for local governments and SOEs to pile into infrastructure 
investment by providing cheap loan capital. See 孙丽朝 [Sun Lichao], 中欧班列挤‘泡沫’ [“Crowding into the China-
Europe Rail ‘Bubble’”], 等深线 [Depth Paper], July 26, 2019, cited in  Ryan Manuel, “Twists in the Belt and Road,” 
China Leadership Monitor, Fall 2019, no. 61, https://www.prcleader.org/manuel-belt-road. 
41 According to the deputy governor of the People’s Bank of China (PBOC), the PBOC and other central organs are 
supporting special funds and rates for Chinese banks and other lenders to facilitate BRI priorities. See 陈雨露 [Chen 
Yulu], 书写 ‘一带一路’  投融资合作新篇章 [“Writing a New Chapter in ‘Belt and Road’ Investment and Financing 
Cooperation”], 全球商业经典 [Global Commerce Classic], no. 6 (2019). For analysis of which firms are getting BRI 
loans, see Li Xiaojun and Zeng Ka, "To Join or Not to Join? How Chinese Firms View the Belt and Road Initiative," 
Pacific Affairs, 92, no. 1 (2019), pp. 5–26.  
42 姚桂梅 [Yao Guimei], “一带一路”建设下的中非产能合作 [“China-Africa Production Cooperation in Construction of 
the ‘Belt and Road’”], 中国共产党新闻网 [Communist Party of China News Network], July 18, 2017, 
http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/0718/c191095-29412141.html. 
43 CMG President Li Jianhong gave a keynote speech at the fifth anniversary party for the BRI, joined by Politburo 
Standing Committee member and State Council Vice Premier, Han Zheng. See 黄玥, 张敏彦 [Huang Yue, Zhang 
Minyan], 共建“一带一路”，习近平提出从“大写意”到“工笔画” [“Jointly Build the Belt and Road: Xi Jinping proposed 
moving from ‘large freehand brushstrokes’ to ‘meticulous detail’”], 新华社 [Xinhua], August 28, 2018, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/xxjxs/2018-08/28/c_1123341344.htm.  
44 Gao, “‘Shekou Model 4.0’ Arrives in Djibouti.” 
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key sectors.45 This surplus is now directed toward foreign markets through a series of policy 
measures, of which the BRI is only the most widely promoted.46 Overcapacity in traditional heavy 
industries, such as steel, cement, and shipbuilding, and in infrastructure construction sectors, such as 
ports, roads, bridges, and railways, has been a policy concern for PRC economic planners for nearly 
a decade.  
The agenda for the 2012 Central Economic Work Conference, for instance, included discussions of 
ways to productively employ this excess industrial capacity to bridge the growing demand-supply 
gap while policy makers undertook structural adjustments to the national economy.47 Thus, when the 
CMG President noted that “China’s port industry should export its capacity to overseas markets 
where the demand for port construction is strong,”48 he was voicing one of the principal domestic 
rationales for China’s investments in the Horn of Africa. Alleviating this overcapacity will be 
essential to avoid economic headwinds created by the many structural ailments in China’s national 
economy, including debt over-accumulation, bankruptcies, lay-offs, and continued damage to the 
environment.49  
The success of the Shekou model depends on more than pouring surplus capital and excess industrial 
capacity into building and operating a port and adjacent free trade zone. Like the Pearl River Delta in 
China, these projects must be connected to the broader economic region in order to achieve anything 
like the economic dynamism of Shenzhen. Accordingly, if Djibouti is to become a regional transport 
gateway and transshipment hub, it will do so largely on the strength of its links to the continent.50 
Ethiopia in particular is an attractive market for the possibilities it presents for long-term 
development. Though Djibouti itself has a tiny population with little economic potential of its own, 
its geographic position provides the opportunity to unlock youthful, fast-growing Ethiopia’s potential 
in global markets.51 Djibouti’s ports are well situated to provide commercial access to land-locked 
Ethiopia, and as a transshipment hub for cargo moving from the west across the Indian Ocean to 
markets in South and East Asia and from the east through the Red Sea and Suez Canal to markets in 
 
45 Most notable among the sectors and products with overcapacity is the construction industry. There is also noted 
overproduction of aluminum, cement, chemicals, coal, coal-fired power, paper, plated glass, shipbuilding, solar power, and 
steel. See International Monetary Fund, “People’s Republic of China: 2017 Article IV Consultation, Staff Report,” IMF 
Country Report, no. 17.247, p. 18. 
46 An authoritative statement of this objective to actively undertake major infrastructure and industrial projects abroad that 
would further facilitate the export of various Chinese products can be found in a 2013 directive, State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China, 国务院关于化解产能严重过剩矛盾的指导意见 [“Guiding Opinions of the State Council on 
Resolving Serious Production Overcapacity Conflicts”], 中华人民共和国中央人民政府 [The Central People’s 
Government of the PRC], October 6, 2013, http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-10/15/content_2507143.htm 
47 张前荣 [Zhang Qianrong], 我国当前产能过剩的现状、原因及应对政策 [“The Current Status, Causes, and Policy 
Responses to China’s Current Production Overcapacity”], 经济预测部-国家信息中心 [Economic Forecasting 
Department—National Information Center], July 16, 2014, http://www.sic.gov.cn/News/455/3068.htm 
48 Deng Yanzi, “CMG Wants to Make African Port of Djibouti ‘New Shekou.’” 
49 He Yafei, “China’s Overcapacity Crisis Can Spur Growth Through Overseas Expansion,” South China Morning Post, 
January 7, 2014, https://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1399681/chinas-overcapacity-crisis-can-spur-
growth-through-overseas. 
50 “Construction of Djibouti’s third sea port begins,” Economist Intelligence Unit, December 28, 2012, 
http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=989990683&Country=D 
51 Ethiopia made peace and restored full diplomatic relations with Eritrea in July 2018, and the two vowed to open their 
borders for trade, giving the nation another potential access point to the oceans. The infrastructure and economic 
relationships for such a development are possible over the medium- to long-term. See Bob Koigi, “Somalia, Eritrea and 
Ethiopia seek economic integration,” Africa Business Communities, July 7, 2018, 
https://africabusinesscommunities.com/news/somalia-eritrea-and-ethiopia-seek-economic-integration/. 
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North Africa and Europe.52 Building the modern infrastructure to do so will be a long-term endeavor. 
However, the implementation of the Shekou Model in East Africa has already achieved significant 
progress, leaving China poised to take advantage of the market potential and resources of the Horn of 
Africa. 
Port Capacity and Characteristics  
The ports in Djibouti consist of several facilities surrounding the Gulf of Tadjoureh, which cuts into 
the east African coastline just southwest of the Bab al-Mandeb. Several of them were in place well 
before the Chinese appeared on the scene in 2013, and were formerly operated under an exclusive 
2006 concession to the United Arab Emirates’ firm Dubai Ports World (DPWorld), which Djibouti 
disputed beginning in 2012 and terminated in 2018 (discussed below).53 Since then, China’s active 
development of Djibouti’s transport sector has positioned Chinese firms to continue expanding their 
role in Djibouti’s port- and military-base dependent economy.  
 
Image 2. The Port of Djibouti 
 
 
52 Edith Mutethya, “Djibouti Launches China-built Free Trade Zone,” China Daily, July 6, 2018, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/06/WS5b3f03d0a3103349141e12a9.html. 
53 DPWorld took the government of Djibouti to the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) in 2018 after 
Djibouti nationalized the Port of Djibouti in February of that year. DPWorld has received five orders from LCIA in its 
favor, including monetary compensation and restoration of their concession. The government of Djibouti has rejected 
these awards, physically seized the asset, restructured its management, and passed legislation that allows it to “terminate 
all contracts relating to strategic infrastructures which are deemed to be contrary to the fundamental interests of the 
Republic.” DPWorld has also brought CMPort to the Hong Kong Court of First Instance, which is still being tried. All of 
these facts are presented with documentation in “Decision,” DPWorld Djibouti FZCO, Dubai (International) Djibouti FZE, 
Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, High Court of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, Court of First Instance, Action no. 1951 of 2018, December 20, 2019, 
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=126220&QS=%24%26%2340%3Bdji
bouti%26%2341%3B&ID=AAAB73AAIAAAXpuAAC&TP=JU.  
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Doraleh Multipurpose Port 
The Doraleh Multipurpose Port is the centerpiece of China’s economic position in Djibouti. It is 
owned and operated by a joint venture between CMPort (with 23.5 percent equity) and the public 
port authority of the Djibouti government, Port de Djibouti, S.A. (PDSA), finalized in December 
2012.54 The facility went into service in May 2017,55 shortly before the formal opening in July of the 
PLA base that abuts its western flank.56 The joint venture gives CMPort a stake in ownership and 
operations across all the dispersed facilities of the Port of the Port of Djibouti, comprising not only 
the modern container terminal formerly operated by DPWorld (the Doraleh Container Terminal), but 
also the Horizon Oil Terminal, the “old port” in the city of Djibouti, Tadjourah Terminal across the 
Gulf to the northwest, and Ghoubet Port, a salt terminal in the far west of the Gulf.57 See Image 2 
above. 
The port was the culmination of a 4-year, $590 million project financed by China’s Exim Bank.58 
China State Construction Engineering Corp and China Civil Engineering Construction Corp designed 
and built the port between 2013 and 2017.59 The port has six 1200 meter ship berths, from 15.3 to 
15.5 meters deep, that take container, dry bulk, breakbulk, and RO/RO cargos.60 They accommodate 
100,000 deadweight ton “Capesize” vessels too large to transit the Suez Canal, which must offload to 
smaller ships at a transshipment hub before cargo can travel to the Mediterranean and beyond. 
Supporting the berths are a 23-hectare container terminal, a 57-hectare cargo yard, a 20-hectare bulk 
terminal, a 15-hectare vehicle yard, and 3.5-hectare warehousing area. The total capacity for non-
containerized cargo is 8.8 million tons.61   
The port’s performance, at least measured in terms of container throughput, is not currently trending 
toward “Dubai” or “Shekou” status. In 2018, the Doraleh Multipurpose Port moved only 49,000 TEU 
of containerized cargo out of a designed capacity of 220,000 TEU.62 The CMPort 2018 annual report 
attributes this 7.5 percent year-on-year reduction in container throughput in Djibouti to decreases in 
 
54 招商局国际有限公司 [China Merchants Holdings (International) Company Limited], “Acquisition of 23.5% interests 
in Joint Venture in Djibouti,” The Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, December 30, 2012, 
https://www1.hkexnews.hk/listedco/listconews/sehk/2012/1230/ltn20121230025.pdf 
55 “Djibouti’s Doraleh Port Officially Opens,” Xinhua, May 24, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-
05/24/c_136312120.htm.   
56 张庆宝 [Zhang Qingbao], 我驻吉布提保障基地部队进驻营区仪式举行 [“Ceremony for the entry of our troops into 
the Djibouti Support Base”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], August 1, 2017, http://www.81.cn/hj/2017-
08/01/content_7699505_5.htm. 
57 Port de Djibouti, S.A., https://www.portdedjibouti.com/ 
58 International Monetary Fund, Djibouti Staff Report for the 2016 Article IV Consultation—Debt Sustainability Analysis, 
February 7, 2017, 3, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/pdf/2017/dsacr1787.pdf; The Export-Import Bank of China, 
中国进出口银行与招商局集团有限公司签署战略合作协议 [“The Export-Import Bank of China and China Merchants 
Group Sign a Strategic Cooperation Agreement”], 中国进出口银行 [The Export-Import Bank of China], December 16, 
2016, http://www.eximbank.gov.cn/tm/Newlist/index_343_29632. 
59 “Djibouti’s Doraleh Port Officially Opens;” 亚吉模式: 铁路全产业链成功实践 [“The China-Ethiopia Model: A 
Successful Framework for End-to-End Railway Construction”], 中国土木工程集团有限公司 [China Civil Engineering 
Construction Corporation], May 22, 2017, http://ccecc.crcc.cn/art/2017/5/22/art_7609_1136232.html.  
60 Except where otherwise noted, data on port characteristics and capacity are from IHS Markit, “Djibouti,” Seaweb Ports, 
World Port Number: PO1478, UNLOCODE: DJJIB 
61 IHS Global Limited, “Djibouti (World Port Number PO1478)” Sea-web Ports (accessed March 17, 2019); “Doraleh 
Multi-Purpose Port,” Port de Djibouti, S.A., http://www.portdedjibouti.com/doraleh-multi-purpose-port/.  
62 TEU is twenty-foot equivalent units, a measure of port throughput based on the average volume of an intermodal 
container. See: “Global Container Terminal Operators Annual Review and Forecast, Annual Report 2019” Drewry 
Maritime Research, p. 165 
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transshipment volume to Ethiopia—that is, precisely the opposite effect of that anticipated by the 
business model.63 Despite reductions in service prices after the opening of the Doraleh Multipurpose 
Port, Ethiopia is pursuing a policy to diversify its international trade routes and is in discussions with 
the Republic of Somaliland to develop Berbera Port, where DPWorld is active after being jettisoned 
from Djibouti. Such developments could weaken the virtual monopoly Djibouti currently holds on 
Ethiopian trade routes to the sea.64 Nonetheless, the CMPort Interim Report for 2019 (the latest 
available as of April 2020) reports increases in container throughput of 11.1 percent and an increase 
of 23.4 percent in bulk cargo volume in the first half of 2019.65  
Tadjourah 
Across the Gulf to the north, the Tadjourah bulk terminal is another of the assets in CMPort’s joint 
venture. Djibouti’s port authority anticipates traffic of 4 million tons of cargo per year,66 but there is 
little reporting in Chinese or industry sources on its operations. The terminal’s construction was 
contracted to a Hubei-based company and was designed to export potash from northern Ethiopia via 
rail from Semere. Construction at the port began in December 2012 and was completed in 2017. 
However, the anticipated rail connection was never completed, and the port has no major road 
connection, so Tadjourah port appears to sit idle. 
Ghoubet  
The Ghoubet mineral terminal was built by China Harbor Engineering Corporation between 2013 
and 2017. With $64 million in preferential loans from China’s Exim Bank, this terminal was 
designed to export 5 million tons per year of processed salt from Djibouti’s nearby Lac Assal, 
reported to contain around 2 billion tons of salt minerals that had previously been harvested only in 
small quantities through traditional methods.67 China Communication Construction Company 
purchased 65 percent of a local salt developer and established the Djibouti Salt Investment Company 
Ltd. to industrialize the scale of extraction and export. China Communication Construction Company 
has exclusive rights for 50 years to develop the local salt and bromine resources.68 
 
63 “China Merchants Port Holding Company, Ltd. Annual Report 2018 (Summary),” China Merchants Port Group Co., 
Ltd., 2019, http://pdf.dfcfw.com/pdf/H2_AN201903291311713389_1.pdf.  
64 Birhanu Fikade, “Djibouti Offers 45% Price Cut in Services of Newly Built Multiuse Port,” The Reporter, December 7, 
2017, https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/djibouti-offers-45-price-cut-services-newly-built-multiuse-port; 
“Economic Transformation in Djibouti—Systematic Country Diagnostic,” World Bank Group, October 2018, 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/437351549918326165/pdf/djibouti-scd-english-version-final-approved-vlogo-
02062019-636852600790519539.pdf.  
65 “China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited Interim Report 2019,” 2019, p. 8, 
http://www.cmport.com.hk/UpFiles/bpic/2019-09/20190923043626360.pdf  
66 “Port of Tadjourah,” Port de Djibouti, SA, https://www.portdedjibouti.com/port-of-tadjourah/ 
67 PRC Ministry of Commerce, 对外投资合作国别(地区)指南–吉布提 (2018版) [“Foreign Investment Cooperation 
Country (Region) Guide—Djibouti—2018 Edition”], 走出去公共服务平台 [Go Out Public Service Platform], 
https://www.yidaiyilu.gov.cn/wcm.files/upload/CMSydylgw/201902/201902010334033.pdf, p. 21; PRC Ministry of 
Commerce, 对外投资合作国别(地区)指南 – 吉布提 (2013版) [“Foreign Investment Cooperation Country (Region) 
Guide—Djibouti—2013 Edition”], 驻吉布提经商参处 [Economic and Commercial Counselor in Djibouti], August 21, 
2014, http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/b/201408/20140800705794.shtml. 
68 中交吉布提盐业投资公司获吉阿萨尔盐湖溴化钠项目特许经营权 [“China Communication Construction Company 
Djibouti Salt Investment Co., Ltd. Was Granted Special Operating Rights for the Djibouti Lake Assal Sodium Bromide 
Project”], 驻吉布提使馆经商处 [Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy in Djibouti], August 25, 2017, 
http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/k/201708/20170802633341.shtml; “Djibouti: Small Country, Big Stakes,” The 
Africa Report, August 21, 2018, https://www.theafricareport.com/541/djibouti-small-country-big-stakes/. 
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None of these bulk terminals is operating near capacity, moving only 4.4 million tons in volume in 
2018 out of a capacity of almost 20 million tons across all of the facilities.69 However, this volume 
was increasing at a rate of 23.4 percent year-on-year at the time of CMPort’s last official report in 
2019. The firm attributes the growth to “increasing import demand for relevant raw materials driven 
by small-scale infrastructure projects in Ethiopia.”70 Still, given that the ports handled 6.52 million 
tons in 2016, the new facilities do not appear to be spurring the desired cargo volume.71 
Non-PRC-operated Ports 
Prior to CMPort’s arrival in 2012, the DPWorld-developed Doraleh Container Terminal and the “old 
port” were the principal Djiboutian ports. The old port is currently being renovated by CMPort and 
the Fujian branch of a British real estate firm, with designs on making it a residential and retail 
zone.72 The Doraleh Container Terminal opened in 2008 and initially served as Djibouti’s only 
modern container port facility, with a designed capacity of 1.5 million TEU. Since the government of 
Djibouti dissolved its joint venture with DPWorld and nationalized the facility in 2018, there has 
been some controversy as to what rights CMPort’s joint venture grants it in this new entity.  
The ongoing row between Djibouti and DPWorld raises the question of how much influence China 
exerts on the Djiboutian government. It seems more than coincidence that relations between 
DPWorld and the government of Djibouti soured as CMPort entered into a “Strategic Partnership 
Agreement” with the Djiboutian port authority in December 2012. This issue is part of litigation 
currently underway in both Hong Kong and London.73 DPWorld alleges that in November 2012, 
CMPort began negotiating “substantive terms” with the Djiboutian port authority to remove 
DPWorld nominated directors from their joint venture with Djibouti. In 2017, Djibouti’s legislature 
passed a law allowing it to renegotiate strategic infrastructure deals and by February 2018, Djibouti 
had terminated its joint venture with DPWorld. Djibouti then seized the port assets under a newly-
formed public port operating company, Société de Gestion du Terminal à Conteneurs de Doraleh 
(SGTD).74 Despite some reports that CMPort is “asserting control of operations at Doraleh Container 
 
69 Great Horn Investment Holding, “Maritime,” http://www.ghih.dj/maritime. 
70 “China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited Interim Report 2019,” p. 8. 
71 “China Merchants Port Holding Company Limited Annual Report 2016,” p. 15. 
72 CMPort is set to lead the Djibouti Old Port Reconstruction Project, but has made no announcements since April 2019. 
招商蛇口、招商港口与吉布提签署吉布提老港改造项目合作框架协议 [“China Merchants Shekou, China Merchants 
Port and Djibouti Sign Cooperation Framework Agreement for Djibouti Old Port Reconstruction Project”], April 26, 2019, 
https://www.cmsk1979.com/news.aspx?type=9&id=7684; 邵轶菁 [Shao Yijing], 招商蛇口发力非洲市场，Savills荣获
吉布提老港项目策略顾问委任 [“China Merchants Shekou Powers African Markets, Savills Appointed as Strategic 
Advisor to Djibouti Old Port Project”], Savills, August 22, 2019.  
73 See “Decision,” High Court of Hong Kong; the London Court of International Arbitration hearings and awards are not 
public, but it has issued no less than five awards in favor of DPWorld, including monetary damages and restoration of 
operating rights; Djibouti has rejected all of the awards. See, Costas Paris, “Djibouti Rejects Court Ruling to Hand Back 
Container Terminal,” Wall Street Journal, January 17, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/djibouti-rejects-court-ruling-to-
hand-back-container-terminal-11579296713. The Hong Kong case is also the first instance of a Chinese SOE being sued 
in Hong Kong by a multinational firm. For details, see 高锋 [Gao Feng], ‘带路’公案：跨国公司告国企 [“‘BRI’ Case: 
Multinational Firms Vs. State-Owned Enterprises”], 自由亚洲电台 [Radio Free Asia], February 11, 2019, 
https://www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/jingmao/gf1-02112019095745.html; see also “Decision,” High Court of Hong 
Kong. 
74 For an agreed timeline of the various stages of DPWorld’s feud with the Djiboutian government, see “Appendix,” 
“DPWorld Djibouti FZCO, Dubai (International) Djibouti FZE, Doraleh Container Terminal SA v. China Merchants Port 
Holdings Company Limited,” High Court of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region Court of First Instance, 
Action No. 1951 of 2018, October 2, 2019, 
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/lrs/common/search/search_result_detail_frame.jsp?DIS=126220&QS=%24%28djibouti%29&
TP=JU  
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Terminal,”75 the firm is not operating the facility at present and Djiboutian officials deny it will do so 
in the future.76 There has been speculation CMPort will take over operations based on its 16% stake 
in the former Doraleh Container Terminal joint venture (through its 23.5% stake in Port de Djibouti, 
S.A.), or as part of a renegotiation of Djiboutian debt to China’s Exim Bank.77  
The status of that container terminal remains obscure in the midst of ongoing litigation in London 
and Hong Kong. However, CMPort’s joint venture partner is the Djiboutian port authority, the public 
entity responsible for port policy and granting concessions in the ports sector. According to the 
World Bank, “there is no clear chain of command or collaboration” for the port authority, which 
“falls under the direct supervision of the President [of Djibouti].”78 Chinese leaders and managers 
have forged close connections with President Guelleh,79 who has been enamored of Chinese 
investment since visiting CMPort’s Shekou facilities in 2012.80 His daughter is a Mandarin-speaker, 
and his top economic advisor, his half-brother Saad Omar Guelleh, is the head of the Port de 
Djibouti, S.A.81 In displacing Dubai, China is plainly the preferred partner for Djibouti’s ports and is 
likely to continue to consolidate its dominant commercial position in the years ahead. 
Horizon Djibouti Fuel Terminal 
This terminal lies west of the Doraleh Container Terminal, and serves as the conduit for some 95 
percent of Djibouti’s hydrocarbon needs, including those of the various military tenants of the 
country.82 It was developed by the Emirates National Oil Company (with public and private 
investment from Djibouti and Kuwait) and consists of a long jetty out to two deep-water berths that 
accommodate tankers of a maximum 80,000 DWT with up to a draught of 18 meters.83 Ashore it 
connects to a tank farm for storage and limited processing of petroleum products (including aviation 
 
75 Costas Paris, “China Tightens Grip on East African Port,” Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2019, 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-tightens-grip-on-east-african-port-11550746800. 
76 Djibouti inspector general Hassan Issa Sultan stated that "there is no China option and no secret plans for the Doraleh 
Container Terminal." See “China Merchants Consolidates its Hold in Djibouti,” The Maritime Executive, February 21, 
2019, https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/china-merchants-consolidates-its-hold-in-djibouti. 
77 Julia Louppova, “A new plan: Djibouti to build another container terminal with CMA CGM,” Port Today, March 29, 
2018, https://port.today/djibouti-new-container-terminal-cma-cgm/; Mercy A. Kuo, “China in Djibouti: the Power of 
Ports,” The Diplomat, March 25, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/china-in-djibouti-the-power-of-ports/. 
78 Martin Humphreys, et al, “Port Development and Competition in East and Southern Africa: Prospects and Challenges,” 
World Bank Group: International Development in Focus, 2019, 
https://olc.worldbank.org/system/files/Overview%20-%20%20Port%20Development%20and%20Competition%20in%20
East%20and%20Southen%20Africa-2.pdf. 
79 Just in the past year, Guelleh met with Xi Jinping in Beijing in April 2019. While in Beijing, he also met with Zhao Leji, 
a member of the CCP’s Politburo Standing Committee who directs China’s Belt and Road leading small group. The 
following month, Guelleh met in Djibouti with the PRC Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi. See: Li Xia, “Xi meets 
Djiboutian President,” Xinhua, 28 April 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-04/28/c_138018385.htm; Li Xia, 
“Senior CCPC official meets Djiboutian president,” Xinhua, April 28, 2019, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-
04/28/c_138019082.htm); Wang Yamei, “Djibouti president meets with Chinese FM, eyes enhanced cooperation in blue 
and digital economies,” Xinhua, January 10, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-01/10/c_138691879.htm 
80 吉布提的中非自贸区 [“China-Africa Free Trade Zone in Djibouti”], 新华 [Xinhua], July 30, 2018, 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/globe/2018-07/30/c_137343110.htm; High Court of Hong Kong, “Appendix.” 
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https://www.theafricareport.com/23719/ethiopias-oil-supply-constrained-by-djibouti-logistics-battle/. 
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fuels), chemical and vegetable oils, and liquid petroleum gases.84 Capacity limitations for growing 
hydrocarbon demand have led to a new agreement with Ethiopia to build another oil terminal. No 
PRC participation in this project is reported.85 
Free Trade Zone 
To the southwest of Doraleh Multipurpose Port is the 48.2 km2 Djibouti International Free Trade 
Zone, a trade and logistics park intended to attract firms to the area to use the port and its connecting 
infrastructure (see Image 3 below). This zone was formally established in March 2015, when CMG 
and the Djibouti Ports & Free Zone Authority signed the “Djibouti Free Trade Zone Project 
Cooperation Framework Agreement.”86 Three Chinese firms (the Dalian Port Authority, CMG, and 
IZP Technologies) are partners in operating the zone. The Dalian Port Corporation began 
construction of the Free Trade Zone in January 2017.87 This initial phase is confined to a 2.4 km2 
“pilot zone” that accounts for $370 million of a planned $3.5 billion investment in a 48 km2 zone, 
claimed to be Africa’s largest.88  
 
Image 3. The Djibouti Port-Park-City89 
China’s stake in the Free Trade Zone is controlled through two joint venture entities established in 
January 2017 (Lac Assal Investment Holding Company Ltd. and East Aden Holding Company Ltd.). 
 
84 Horizon Djibouti Terminals Ltd., https://www.horizon-terminals.com/services_existing_terminals_h-djibouti.html 
85 Angeline Mbogo, “Ethiopian & Djiboutian Governments to Build Oil Terminal in Djibouti Worth $220m,” The Kenyan 
Wall Street, July 11, 2018, https://kenyanwallstreet.com/ethiopian-djiboutian-govts-to-build-oil-terminal-in-djibouti-
worth-220m/. 
86 中非合作吉布提自贸区开工 [“China-Africa Cooperation Begins in the Djibouti Free Trade Zone”], 中非合作论坛 
[China-Africa Cooperation Forum], January 24, 2017, https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/zflt/chn/zfgx/t1433191.htm.  
87 中企参与的吉布提国际自贸区正式开工建设 [“Chinese Firms Formally Begin Construction at the Djibouti 
International Free Trade Zone”], 新华社 [Xinhua News], January 17, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2017-
01/17/c_1120327873.htm; “Construction begins on Djibouti International Free Trade Zone (DIFTZ), Reuters, January 19, 
2017, http://www.zawya.com/story/Construction_begins_on_Djibouti_International_Free_Trade_Zone_DIFTZ-
ZAWYA20170118131616/.  
88 Djibouti Ports & Free Zones Authority, “Djibouti International Free Trade Zone,” http://dpfza.gov.dj/facilities/diftz 
(accessed March 17, 2019). 
89 Image from Silk Road E-Merchant’s Website depicting the Ports, Parks, City overview of Djibouti. (Labels and yellow 
graphics created by authors. Silk Road E-Merchants is a joint venture of China Merchant Group and IZP Group 
established in 2016 to facilitate trade through big data and overseas financial services. See presentation containing image 
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At the time of their creation, CMPort granted a loan of “up to $150 million” with an aggregate term 
not to exceed 10 years, yielding 40 percent and 26.7 percent equity interests in these joint ventures.90 
Both joint ventures are also involved in upgrading port facilities and planning and building 
surrounding industrial zones.91 According to CMPort, these ventures initially invested $12.3 million 
in the two Free Trade Zone joint ventures.92 Then, in January 2019, CMPort and two other CMG 
subsidiaries (China Merchants Investments Limited and Cheer Signal) announced they would inject 
an additional $30 million in capital.93   
The Free Trade Zone is divided into four “industrial clusters.” One is focused on the logistics 
industry and will support provision of transport, bonded warehousing, logistics and distribution 
capabilities. Another will focus on “business industry” functions, such as bulk goods transactions, 
merchandise display, and duty-free retail. A third cluster will focus on the “business support” sector 
and cater to financial services, information services, hotels, office buildings, and training. Finally, a 
manufacturing cluster will support packaging, light processing of raw materials, food processing, and 
auto parts assembly.94 The idea, in short, is to generate trade to enable the port to prosper. 
The Djibouti International Free Trade Zone remains in early Phase I and no major facilities or 
operating industrial sites appear to have been constructed.95 However, 21 companies are reported to 
have signed agreements to operate in the zone.96 Prior to its limited opening, energetic promotion of 
business opportunities was underway in China, with Djiboutian officials and Chinese executives 
touting the convenience and market access that the unfinished zone is to support.97 The Chairman of 
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Berthing at Djibouti’s Doraleh Multipurpose Port”], 招商局港口 [China Merchants Ports], April 24, 2017, 
http://www.cmzd.com/xwzx/info.aspx?itemid=2396.  
91 China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, “Annual Report 2016,” 
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Company Limited, “Annual Report 2017,” http://www.cmport.com.hk/UpFiles/bpic/2018-04/20180426042934273.pdf, p. 
87. 
92 China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, “Annual Report 2016,” p. 199.  
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Investment in the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone,” China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited, January 17, 
2017, http://www.cmport.com.hk/enTouch/news/Detail.aspx?id=10007165.  
94 Djibouti Ports & Free Zones Authority, “Djibouti International Free Trade Zone,” http://dpfza.gov.dj/facilities/diftz 
(accessed March 17, 2019). 
95 Based on open-source satellite imagery, accessed March 2020. 
96 Edith Mutethya, “Djibouti launches China-built free trade zone,” China Daily, July 6, 2018, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201807/06/WS5b3f03d0a3103349141e12a9.html.  
97 For example, the free trade zone hosted conferences in Guangzhou to promote business opportunities in 2015. See: 吉布
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Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority stated in 2017 that the zone would become a flourishing 
business district “in the next few years,” and other officials have said the port can be expected to 
handle $7 billion in trade during its first two years.98 The business operations have not yet met 
expectations, but the infrastructure to support such development is increasingly intact. 
Inland Transport Infrastructure 
Chinese firms have plans to develop extensive infrastructure to connect Djibouti’s ports to key 
elements of the Ethiopian economy. This emerging transport network is fundamental to the long-term 
viability of Chinese investments in the Djibouti ports and free trade zone. These include rail, road, 
and pipeline networks extending westward to Ethiopia’s capital, Addis Ababa, and southward to 
Ethiopian oil and gas fields, principally the Ogaden Basin. Some infrastructure has been constructed 
and put into operation, but much remains uncompleted. 
Railroads  
The Addis Ababa–Djibouti Railway is the flagship component of China’s push to connect Djibouti 
with the Ethiopian economy. China Railway Group (CRG) and China Civil Engineering Construction 
Corporation (CCECC) built the railway connecting the Ethiopian capital to Djibouti between 2011 
and 2016.99 Exim Bank furnished 70 percent of the capital for the Ethiopia segment of the line ($2.4 
billion out of the total $3.4 billion). The remaining 30 percent was funded by the Ethiopian 
Government. 100 Fifteen percent of the Djibouti section, costing $578 million, was funded by the 
Djibouti government, with the rest financed by Chinese banks.101 The 756 km rail project officially 
started commercial operations in January 2018, allowing freight transport from Djibouti’s port to the 
Ethiopian capital.102 Some 90 percent of the total activity at Djibouti's ports is Ethiopian import or 
export trade.103 
This new railway connecting Ethiopia and Djibouti represents the first major project of this type 
since the French built a rail line in the 1890s. It is also the first fully electrified rail on the African 
continent and the first outside China to use exclusively Chinese standards.104 It will reduce the travel 
time for cargo from three days for trucking to less than 10 hours, and is projected to eventually carry 
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8.5 million tons of freight annually.105 CRG and CCECC inked a 6-year contract to operate the 
railway in 2015, but encountered a variety of obstacles, from electricity outages to cattle collisions. 
Sinosure, the central state-owned Chinese insurance firm, wrote off $1 billion in losses on the project 
and Exim Bank halted funding to construct a second track.106 Nonetheless, Chinese firms anticipate 
the railroad’s freight capacity will expand after Chinese firms build an additional 1,500 miles of rail 
line in Ethiopia.107  
Recent reports confirm that the final sections of rail connections to the Doraleh Container Terminal 
and Multipurpose Port are now completed.108 Precise figures are not available regarding how much 
cargo is still being trucked or conveyed by new railway. However, according to one report, the 
railway was heavily used over the summer of 2019 to ship approximately 70,000 tons of fertilizer 
from Djibouti’s ports to Ethiopia.109 The report indicated 75 freight trucks would have been required 
to move the equivalent of a single train trip. Rapid delivery of more fertilizer is reportedly a boon to 
Ethiopian farm productivity—especially cotton cultivation, which helps feed its budding textile 
industry.110  
Some progress has been made on connecting the new railway to the northern areas of Ethiopia. A 
Chinese-built industrial park in Kombolcha, a city in Ethiopia’s northern Amhara State, will soon be 
connected to the rest of Ethiopia’s national rail network and, through it, to Djibouti.111 The first phase 
of the Awash-Woldiya Railway, contracted to the Turkish firm Yapi Merkezi, runs from Awash to 
Kombolcha and is currently being finalized. At 97 percent completion, the line will likely be 
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electrified and in operation sometime this year.112 Official reporting from the PRC Ministry of 
Commerce indicates that in the north, the Mekele-Tadjourah rail line remains at the proposal stage.113  
These developments are exceptions, however, and the Ethiopian logistics sector largely lags behind 
projected requirements. The state-owned Ethiopian Shipping & Logistics Services Enterprise 
monopolizes the multi-modal transport system from Djibouti to Ethiopian regions. The system is 
inefficient and expensive, which stymies Ethiopia’s import and export sectors. According to some 
studies, restrictive licensing practices have further increased shipping costs by 30-50 percent.114 
Currently the main railway is only used by a few big export companies because of high rail-rates 
relative to trucking and the lack of branch lines to Ethiopian depots and industrial zones.115 This 
could change, as the rail line has recently completed its connection to the Doraleh Multipurpose Port 
in Djibouti.116 The lack of rail service to Tadjourah port further limits Ethiopia’s development.117 
Highways  
While the growing rail capacity will eventually supplant some trucking, there remains high demand 
for roads connecting Djibouti’s ports to inland markets. Road construction, however, lags even rail 
development. Some Ethiopian analysts suggest this is purposeful to encourage increased use of the 
rail line, allowing Ethiopian railways to reduce debt incurred by such rapid expansion.118 
The primary roadway connecting Djibouti to Ethiopia is Djibouti’s route nationale (RN-1), which 
runs from the capital to Galafi, through Awash, and on to Addis Ababa. Approximately 1,000 trucks 
move along the road per day, carrying mostly fuel and other liquid bulk.119 Some sections of this road 
are so severely degraded the actual paved roads are untraversable and trucks are forced to create 
bypasses across stretches of the desert.120 China’s Exim Bank provided financing for Ethiopia’s first 
modern highway from Addis Ababa to Adama, which in 2014 linked the capital to Mojo dry port, 
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one of the areas where Chinese companies have constructed an industrial park.121 Other Chinese-led 
road projects are also organized around industrial parks in the region. Running from Mojo dry port 
southeast of Addis Ababa to the flagship industrial park in Hawassa, the Hawassa Expressway is set 
to be completed in late 2020.122 China’s Exim Bank is financing the fourth phase of this project, 
which will be built between Negele and Hawassa.123 Increased traffic from industrial development is 
creating demand for improved routes, which could lead to enhanced trucking capacity to the rest of 
Ethiopia and Djibouti’s ports. 
Pipelines  
Running parallel to the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railway is a Chinese-financed water pipeline, another 
infrastructure project vital to allowing the “Shekou Model” to take root in arid Djibouti. Since June 
2017, the water pipeline has transported groundwater pumped from wells in Ethiopia to Djibouti’s 
key towns of Ali-Sabieh, Dikhil, Arta and the capital, Djibouti, some 320 km away.124 Djibouti’s 
ability to develop into an industrial and trading hub requires a stable and sufficient water source to 
support a growing population and sustain economic activity, even in periods of drought. Once fully 
operational, the pipeline should provide 100,000 m3 of water per day.125 Some 95 percent of the 
capital for the $340 million project was provided through concessional Exim Bank loans with a 
seven-year grace period and a 2 percent interest rate.126  
A key aspect of China’s strategic and commercial interest in the Horn of Africa is the potential for oil 
and gas development in the Ogaden Basin, located in southeastern Ethiopia along its undefined 
border with Somalia. Chinese energy developer Poly-GCL signed an agreement with the Djibouti 
Government in 2013 to invest $4 billion to build a natural gas pipeline and additional port and other 
facilities for gas exports. If the pipeline is completed, Ethiopian natural gas would travel from the 
Ogaden Basin to the port of Damerjog, southeast of the Djiboutian capital (see Image 2, above).127 
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There is currently no indication construction of the pipeline has begun despite official Ethiopian 
projections that production would start in 2020.128 
Despite some obstacles, China’s investment and construction have driven major improvement to 
Djibouti’s infrastructure and its logistical capacity to support the development of the regional 
economies of the Horn of Africa. According to the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (LPI) 
for international trade, Djibouti shot up in the world rankings from 134th in 2014, to 90th in 2018.129 
However, the long-term utility of this improved transport connectivity will depend on the strength of 
inland markets and resources. 
Inland Markets and Resources 
Chinese investments in port and intermodal infrastructure in Djibouti are premised on the theory that 
the inland markets and resources of eastern Africa will make the projects economically viable. 
Djibouti itself has a GDP of only $2.96 billion (in current USD), albeit growing at 5.5 percent as of 
2018.130 The small nation has an estimated population of slightly less than a million people, some 75 
percent of whom live in the capital.131 Services compose 76.1 percent of Djibouti’s GDP, most of 
which can be attributed to freight forwarding to and from the country’s ports.132 It has little to offer 
world markets other than its strategic location and its capacity to connect to other, more substantial, 
economies in the region.  
Demographics  
Without other economies in tow, it would be untenable to tether major economic investment to such 
a slender demographic profile. However, the Horn of Africa contains almost 130 million people, with 
over half the population of each nation under the age of 24 years.133 As Horn of Africa economies go, 
Ethiopia is the main prize. It has a much larger population base (nearly 110 million, second after 
Nigeria on the continent) that is growing at nearly three percent a year (11th fastest in the world).134 
Over 80 percent of that large and growing population lives in rural areas and some 65 percent of the 
population is 24 years old or younger.135 According to the IMF, Ethiopia’s GDP in 2018 was $85.36 
billion. It grew at nine percent in 2018/2019, making it the fastest growing economy in the region.136 
Despite very low per capita income ($790), it is expected to sustain high growth rates into the 
2020s.137 From the Chinese perspective, conditions are ripe in Ethiopia for the kind of economic 
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development enjoyed in the PRC during its reform and opening period. Some Chinese analysts 
consider it “China in Africa” and believe the Chinese model is uniquely suited to its demographic 
and economic conditions.138 
China’s investments in Djibouti will likely succeed or fail on the strength of Ethiopia’s markets and 
resources. Given that Ethiopia, as a land-locked state, relies on Djibouti’s infrastructure for its own 
prosperity, this bet may pay off over time. The PRC Ministry of Commerce reported that “Africa’s 
young population, low labor costs, coupled with low raw material and energy costs, as well as tariff 
preferences given to African countries by the European Union and the United States” make Ethiopia 
in particular “one of the most promising destinations” for Chinese capital.139  
Reflecting its own vested interest in this, Ethiopia agreed in 2018 to take a stake in the Port of 
Djibouti after Djibouti terminated the DPWorld contract.140 Recognizing its over-reliance on 
Djiboutian ports, Ethiopia is seeking to diversify its access to global markets, and recently undertook 
investments in other regional ports to expand its avenues of access to ocean transport. One such port 
is DPWorld-run Berbera in Somaliland, where Ethiopia took a 19 percent stake in a 30-year 
concession and also secured rights to develop a Berbera Corridor of links to Ethiopian markets.141 
After reaching a peace deal in July 2018 with neighboring Eritrea, Ethiopia also began actively 
seeking to develop road and rail infrastructure and potentially port facilities in its northeastern 
neighbor to export potash.142  
Hydrocarbons  
China invests in a range of high-profile projects in Ethiopia, including a signature effort to develop 
and connect the Ogaden’s Calub and Hilala gas fields in Southeast Ethiopia to liquid natural gas 
(LNG) facilities in the Port of Djibouti. China’s Poly-GCL Petroleum Group Holdings Ltd. began 
developing these fields after it signed a production sharing agreement with Ethiopia in 2013. It 
drilled its first appraisal well in the Calub field in September 2015, and produced the first barrel of 
oil in June 2018.143 To date, no investors have attempted to export the Ogaden’s oil and gas 
resources.144 However, in November 2017 China’s POLY-GCL Petroleum Group Holdings Ltd. 
signed a $4 billion memorandum of understanding to build a natural gas pipeline, liquefaction plant, 
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and export terminal in Damerjog, Djibouti.145 The pipeline is projected to transport 12 billion cubic 
meters of natural gas a year from Ethiopia to Djibouti, of which 10 million cubic meters is expected 
to be exported to China.146 
China is not a stranger to this hydrocarbon-producing region of Ethiopia. In 2007, workers from 
Zhongyuan Petroleum Exploration Bureau working in an oil field in the Ogaden region came under 
attack by 200 armed Somali separatists from the Ogaden National Liberation Front. Nine Chinese 
nationals and 65 Ethiopian employees were killed and another seven Chinese workers were abducted 
and later recovered by the Ethiopian Government.147 The Ogaden is home to ethnic Somalis and the 
border in the region remains disputed between Somalia and Ethiopia. Despite previous conflict in the 
area,148 peace deals were signed between the Ethiopian Government and local separatists in 2010149 
and again in October 2018.150 If the more recent deal holds, stability in the Ogaden would bode well 
for Chinese energy development there. 
Industrial Parks  
Chinese investors have launched a number of industrial parks throughout Ethiopia to leverage new 
logistical capabilities as infrastructure development emerges. The resources and labor are abundant, 
but “what Africa lacks is precisely the supporting infrastructure and industrial parks,” according to a 
PRC Ministry of Commerce report.151 Echoing China’s “Shekou Model,” talk of an “Ethiopia 
Model” swirls in Chinese business reporting. The plan entails “national investment, Chinese 
construction, [Chinese] management for three years, and promoting this across all of Ethiopia,” 
according to Ethiopia Industrial Parks Development Corporation President Sisay Gemechu.152  
The flagship model industrial park is at Hawassah, and it focuses on the textile and apparel 
industries. Completed by the CCECC in July 2016, it is operated on a three-year lease by the PRC 
firm Kunshan Economic and Technological Development Zone, during which time it is training 
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Ethiopian managers.153 Chinese investment in Hawassah and other industrial parks is motivated by 
the availability of resources close to the industrial plant. As one manufacturer put it,  
Chinese textile companies are moving closer to their raw material base, the cotton producing 
countries such as Ethiopia. This is part of its value chain repositioning, a strategy most 
Chinese companies are adopting. Companies are also using Africa as a gateway to emerging 
markets on the continent and to the European market.154 
Investment in the industrial parks is not limited to Chinese firms, and the logic of locating production 
facilities near the source of essential resources is not lost on others in the manufacturing industry. 
PVH Corp, owner of the Tommy Hilfiger and Calvin Klein brands, moved some of its clothing 
manufacturing to Hawassah in 2016.155 By 2017, at least 16 companies produced clothing at 
Hawassah. One such company, Hydra Mani, reportedly was exporting $1 million of product a 
month.156 Indeed, Ethiopia explicitly markets its industrial parks as an integrated solution “aimed at 
coordinated production along value chains,” by virtue of their locations “along key economic 
corridors” and connection to ports.157  
Ethiopia is also a highly valued location for major truck manufacturing companies, including the 
Africa branch of state-owned China National Heavy Duty Truck Group Co., Ltd. (Sinotruk). Its 
representative explained in 2017 that “Ethiopia is a strategic market for Sinotruk.” The company 
jointly runs an assembly plant in Addis Ababa with the Ethiopian manufacturing company N.A Metal 
Industry & Engineering Co, which Sinotruk touts as “an example of China-Africa production 
capacity cooperation.”158 
Ethiopia seeks to diversify its exports beyond textiles, currently its principal export. CCECC won a 
$125 million bid in May 2016 to assist this effort by constructing Adama Industrial Park focused on 
manufacturing heavy machinery.159 After Hunan provincial officials announced a joint venture with 
Ethiopia during the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum, this became the first industrial park developed 
by a PRC provincial government.160 With government support in place, Sany Group and other 
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Chinese manufacturers quickly signed MOUs to produce construction machinery, wind energy 
equipment, automobile parts, and other equipment there.161 
Chinese promoters now pair the “Shekou Model” and the “Ethiopia Model” as a composite 
“Ethiopia-Djibouti Model” for regional development. This model, of course, relies largely on 
Chinese labor, capital, and expertise. According to the Deputy Director of the China Enterprise 
Reform and Development Society (a body under the State Council's State-Owned Assets Supervision 
and Administration that supervises central SOEs), the model envisions increasing roles for Chinese 
enterprises in financing, design, construction, equipment and materials, and operational 
management.162 Ultimately, the purpose of this Ethiopia-Djibouti model is to form new international 
production chains to redistribute production capacity globally for the future transformation of the 
Chinese economy.163   
 
Image 4. The “Ethiopia-Djibouti Model”164 
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Finance 
Securing financing from China remains the first and most urgent priority if these projects are to be 
viable. Several Chinese banks have made concerted efforts to make capital available to firms 
working in far-flung locations.165 One example is the Silk Road International Bank, established in 
Djibouti in November 2016.166 This bank is a joint venture with the Djibouti Ministry of Finance, 
which funded 25 percent of the endeavor, and two Chinese companies—the IZP Group, which 
provided 25 percent of the funding, and the Silk Road E-Merchants Group, which provided 20 
percent. It represents the first instance in which a Chinese commercial bank has obtained a banking 
license in Africa. 167 According to the Vice-Chairman of the Silk Road International Bank, the new 
venture “will provide a package of financial solutions for China-Africa bilateral trade and the 
investment of China in Africa, [and] provide safe and convenient payment and settlement service for 
numerous Chinese enterprises in Africa.”168 The bank provides commercial and retail banking 
services to facilitate cross-border payments and enable Chinese firms to transact locally for much of 
their business operation in Africa.169  
The Silk Road International Bank also apparently performs a number of core functions for the 
government of Djibouti. The Chinese State Council Information Office reported that the bank “will 
primarily provide services for the Government of Djibouti’s revenue and expenditures, such as 
handl[ing] civil servant wage distribution, pension payments, and business taxes. It will also serve as 
the main bank for trade settlement and capital transactions for local Chinese enterprises.”170 In effect, 
this bank, which is substantially controlled by Chinese entities, has taken over several of Djibouti’s 
treasury functions. There are plans to expand these financial services across the continent. One 
Chinese official stated the PRC is considering whether to establish a second African branch of the 
Silk Road International Bank in Togo.171 
Chinese and African banks enjoy access to a variety of funding sources for their work on the 
continent. China has two funds for development in Africa: the China-Africa Development Fund, 
established 2006, and the China-Africa Industrial Capacity Cooperation Fund, announced by Xi 
Jinping during the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in Johannesburg in December 
2015.172 The new Fund was officially registered in January 2016, when $10 billion was made 
available for investment in African manufacturing, high-tech goods, energy, mining, infrastructure, 
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and finance. It enjoys the backing of the Exim Bank’s foreign exchange reserves and Xi Jinping’s 
imprimatur as a BRI-facilitating venture,173 which enabled the Fund to participate in a $60 billion aid 
package that specifically targeted the African market between 2016 and 2019.174  
Such initiatives give Chinese firms increased access to African markets and resources beyond the 
Djibouti-Ethiopia corridor. Continent-wide PRC efforts to court African leaders and businesses are 
ongoing. One such example is the construction of the African Union Headquarters building in Addis 
Ababa in 2012. This $200m project was paid for entirely by the PRC government and was 
inaugurated by the Chairman of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, Jia 
Qinglin.175 The Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Yi, also spoke in June 2017 to African 
Union leaders to laud China’s successes in east Africa and market them to other African states. 
China’s growing influence on the continent allowed Wang Yi’s pitch to extend beyond purely 
economic matters, touching on security cooperation and PRC military aid to African Union 
nations.176 These military overtures mark a new direction in Chinese foreign policy, manifested most 
concretely in China’s military presence in Djibouti. 
Naval and Military Component 
Djibouti’s position astride major SLOCs at a critical chokepoint for global trade endows it with 
considerable strategic importance. Its proximity to ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the 
presence of American, Japanese and European military forces on which the Chinese would like to 
keep tabs provide additional purposes for the PLA’s presence. Still, China’s decision to establish an 
overseas military facility in Djibouti marks a decisive break with many decades of vehement official 
disavowal that China would take this path.177 China’s former reluctance to establish an overseas 
military base reflected its broader foreign policy orientation, well-summarized in Deng Xiaoping’s 
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admonition to keep a low profile and focus on developing China’s economy, since China largely 
enjoys a secure international environment.178 The base in Djibouti represents a stark break from 
Deng’s policy line. 
The functions and missions of the base are becoming clearer as it develops. PRC officials insist the 
facility is intended as a resupply base for the PLAN “anti-piracy task force” deployment to the Gulf 
of Aden and is not intended for further projection of military power.179 However, official PRC media 
has also reported, 
The base will ensure China’s performance of [additional] missions, such as escorting, peace-
keeping and humanitarian aid in Africa and west Asia…. will also be conducive to overseas 
tasks including military cooperation, joint exercises, evacuating and protecting overseas 
Chinese and emergency rescue, as well as jointly maintaining security of international 
strategic seaways.180  
Perhaps gradually unveiling the full extent of the base’s role lessens the immediate impact of the 
strategic shift, but as then-PLAN commander ADM Wu Shengli stated in 2016 the base will clearly 
enable China’s military to “carry out larger-scale missions in broader areas.”181  
Observations of China’s recent operations in Djibouti (see below) further underscore the base’s 
mission creep. The base marks a significant step toward a more global PLAN. At a minimum, these 
facilities will help the PRC provide security and emergency evacuation for Chinese nationals 
working in Africa and the large volume of Chinese investment on the continent provides powerful 
justification for positioning some security capacity in proximity to these expensive projects. This 
section examines the development, characteristics, and current utilization of the Djibouti base. 
Base Development  
The first reports of a PLA base in Djibouti emerged in 2013, when the PLA National Defense 
University drafted a study for the Central Military Commission promoting the idea.182 Xi Jinping 
approved the report and by February 2014 then-PRC Minister of Defense, Chang Wanquan, visited 
Djibouti to sign a “Security and Defense Partnership Agreement.” The agreement allowed PLA 
access to Djibouti and offered Chinese support for the Djibouti armed forces. In November 2015, a 
high-level military delegation led by the Central Military Commission Chief of Staff General Fang 
Fenghui and PLAN Chief of Staff Admiral Qiu Yanpeng met with Djibouti President Guelleh to 
finalize details for the base.183 Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf explained that 
China was given a 10-year lease at $20 million per year, with an option for another 10-year 
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extension. Youssouf emphasized that “the terms of the contract and agreement are very clear and 
they are the same for each and every country that requested military presence in Djibouti.”184  
There is very little Chinese or other open source reporting on the specific terms of the basing deal 
between China and Djibouti. A lecturer at the PLA’s Space Engineering University described the 
status of forces agreement as follows: 
According to the “China-Djibouti Status of Forces Agreement,” the troops stationed in 
Djibouti enjoy a series of privileges, exemptions, and conveniences. These privileges, 
exemptions, and conveniences are concrete manifestations of state immunity, including: 
inviolability of personal safety; inviolability of the camp, facilities, equipment, and property; 
jurisdictional immunities; convenience in the areas of exit and entry [of the country], 
taxation, customs, health, and quarantine; freedom of movement, freedom of communication, 
and freedom of travel.185 
There are still too few details to accurately appraise whether the terms of the China-Djibouti deal are 
indeed similar to those of other countries, as Youssouf claims. At minimum, the disclosed details 
guarantee the basic operations of the base, including personnel movement, radio frequency usage, 
and the flow of supplies.     
Construction began in February 2016, and by July 11, 2017 the facility was formally opened with 
substantial fanfare in the PRC press.186 Foreign commentators have long referred to it as a “naval 
base”—and its inauguration was indeed led by two PLAN senior captains, base commander Liang 
Yang and political commissar Li Chunpeng.187 The first PLAN vessels to visit the base in Djibouti 
were the Type-071 amphibious transport dock Jinggangshan and the mobile landing platform 
Donghaidao, which delivered the first troops and personnel to be stationed there.188  
Capabilities  
From the first delivery of troops, China has augmented its security presence very gradually, thereby 
muting potential alarm concerning its change in posture. Now that the base is operating, some limited 
assessments of its capabilities and purposes are possible. First, its position southwest and adjacent to 
the Doraleh Multipurpose Port (see Image 5 below) gives the base a potentially larger capacity, as 
commercial berths could be made available for all but the largest PLAN vessels. Even excluding 
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these potential dual-use facilities, the military base alone is capable of supporting a wide range of 
PLA operations well beyond logistical support.  
 
 
Image 5. Doraleh Multipurpose Port and PLA Support Base (December 10, 2018) 
Open-source satellite imagery shows facilities for fuel, weapons, and equipment storage and various 
maintenance facilities for ships and aircraft.189 There is no dry dock, floating or fixed, visible at the 
facility, but there are locations to the south of the main pier available for such a facility. As noted 
above, its proximity to the expansive yards at the Doraleh Multipurpose Port provides for significant 
augmentation of base operations. Some estimates suggest as many as 10,000 personnel could be 
stationed on the base.190 At 4,000 personnel, the U.S. military presence is currently the largest of the 
seven nations with military facilities hosted by Djibouti.191  
Open-source descriptions of the base’s facilities are trickling in over time. The October 2017 issue of 
Naval & Merchant Ships, a Chinese publication, included a graphic of the base that marked, among 
other structures, an armory, equipment support area, subterranean entrance, barracks, heliport, oil 
depot, reinforced bunker, and pier (see Image 6 below).192 Official sources confirm an organic PLAN 
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petroleum, oil, and lubricant (POL) transport detachment is deployed on base, likely to carry out 
future refueling operations.193 Analysis of satellite imagery found “at least 10 storage barracks, [an] 
ammunition point, [an] office complex and a heliport.” The report also noted two entrances to the 
base (one connecting to the main road and another connecting to the container terminal) and four 
layers of defensive works.194 The heliport includes several hangars and a 400-meter (approx. 1,312 
foot) runway with air traffic control.195 Thus far, no aircraft have been reported deployed to the 
installation, nor could combat or transport aircraft use this short runway. 
 
Image 6. Naval & Merchant Ships depiction of activities at Djibouti Support Base 
Construction of a dedicated naval pier is a key development in the base’s ability to support PLAN 
operations. In May 2018, China began rapid construction of a 330-meter long (nearly 1,100 foot) 
pier, which is now largely complete.196 When asked whether the pier could accommodate a Chinese 
aircraft carrier, China’s Defense Ministry spokesperson Wu Qian did not deny the possibility, stating, 
“the relevant facilities are progressing as planned. The construction of this facility is for China to 
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better carry out escorts in Somali waters in the Gulf of Aden and humanitarian rescue missions.”197 
Draught considerations are likely the biggest constraint on the types of ships that could berth at the 
Chinese base. Nonetheless, with a total of 660-meters (2,165 feet) of berthing, the pier has significant 
space for the PLAN’s surface combatants, especially if similar types nest alongside each other. Water 
depth is not an issue at the nearby Doraleh Multipurpose Port, at least. Its 50-foot depth was 
sufficient to moor a Type-071 LPD there in July 2018.198      
Station security is provided by a battalion-grade PLAN Marine Corps (PLANMC) unit that first 
deployed from Zhanjiang on July 11, 2017.199 Initially led by Major Jiang Zhichao, the battalion 
comprises three mechanized infantry companies, based on a battalion-wide field march exercise in 
January 2018. During the exercise, one third of the battalion sortied each day, rather than en masse. 
Video footage of the exercise shows company-sized infantry units marching in the field.200 These 
infantry companies are reinforced by an unknown number of wheeled combat vehicles, including at 
least eight ZBL-08 infantry fighting vehicles and two ZTL-11 assault vehicles.201 
Such displays offer some idea of the combat strength present at the Djibouti Support Base. Chinese 
media coverage of the 2019 Lunar New Year greeting showed approximately 180 standing 
personnel, two ZTL-11 assault vehicles, four ZBL-08 infantry fighting vehicles, and two Mengshi 
light vehicles.202 This likely reflects the battalion command staff and one mechanized infantry 
company, although it is unclear whether each company is supported by the same number of combat 
vehicles. Other support elements, such as artillery batteries or aviation units, have not been observed 
at the Djibouti installation. The addition of PLAN or PLANMC rotary wing aircraft would greatly 
enhance the battalion’s mobility and range.  
Recent reports also indicate the presence of a PLANMC special forces detachment on base. Base 
commander Senior Captain Liang Yang oversaw related counterterrorism and law enforcement 
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training for Djiboutian Coast Guard personnel in early February 2020. Members of the PLANMC 
special forces detachment conducted training exercises such as boarding, anti-piracy, and hostage 
rescue using rigid-hull inflatable craft equipped with 12.7mm Type-89 heavy machine guns.203  
 
Image 7. Djibouti base opening ceremony204 
Combat training involving the PLANMC began less than two months after the base’s opening. This 
training appears geared toward conditioning the troops for operations in Djibouti’s harsh desert 
conditions. Appendix A details all reported combat training events. These exercises provide some 
insight into the combat capabilities and levels of readiness of the PLANMC troops defending the 
base. In large part, tactical weapons training is focused on small unit rapid response against threats to 
PRC personnel in Djibouti and the base itself. Satellite imagery suggests there is an urban-warfare 
training facility in the southeastern corner of the base, perhaps for this purpose. However, there has 
been no specific mention in open source Chinese-language materials of any role for this unit to 
conduct such missions within the region. 
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Functions and Missions  
Since 2015, the PLAN has been tasked not only with “near seas defense,” its limited historical role, 
but also the more expansive mission of “far seas protection.”205 This entails securing strategic 
SLOCS, protecting citizens and investments overseas, and conducting military diplomacy.206 The 
anti-piracy mission preceded this doctrinal shift and has now given way to a range of actual and 
potential roles for the PLAN units operating outside of China’s immediate backyard. Non-combatant 
evacuation operations are plainly a priority, after the hard lessons of evacuating 35,000 Chinese 
nationals from war-torn Libya in 2011.207 Another smaller-scale operation involving three PLAN 
ships evacuated PRC (and other) citizens from Yemen to Djibouti in 2015.208 Djibouti is ideally 
positioned to support PLAN operations in those hot spots.  
Logistics Support for the PLAN  
Supporting anti-piracy escort task forces was a major justification to construct the Djibouti Support 
Base. The PLAN has relied heavily on the port of Djibouti for quite some time. Beginning with the 
4th Escort Task Force’s port-call in January 2010, every escort task force to date has stopped in 
Djibouti for replenishment (补给), rest, rehabilitation and training (休整), inspection and 
maintenance (检修), and other diplomatic, goodwill, and cultural activities (see Appendix B).209 
PLAN ships almost always moor in Djibouti’s old port area where they are greeted by PRC embassy 
staff and nationals brought to welcome each ship. Since construction of the base, senior officers and 
personnel from the installation have also been on hand to greet each ship entering the port. 
The PLAN spends a significant amount of time in Djibouti. Escort task forces, comprised of two 
surface combatants and a replenishment ship, conduct their in-port rest and replenishment in rounds. 
The vessels in each three-ship task force typically take turns entering port, while the remaining two 
continue performing escort missions. Since ships most often remain pier-side for five days, this 
means a PLAN ship will be in Djibouti for much of the month when each task force visits.210 Some 
task forces visit twice during their deployments.211 This time adds up. According to senior leaders in 
the PLAN Logistics Department, the cycle time for rest and replenishment of escort task forces in 
Djibouti will be greatly shortened as conditions mature, particularly conditions at the support base. 
Improvements in berthing, material supply, medical support, and repairs will also reduce reliance on 
in-theater replenishment ships.212  
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The Djibouti base can also facilitate longer duration deployments of PLAN escort task forces in 
theater. PLAN escort forces spend up to 40 percent of their three-month deployment cycles underway 
across 6,000-7,000 nautical miles to reach the Gulf of Aden, requiring their destroyers and frigates to 
replenish twice on route.213 Although experience and training in underway replenishment was sorely 
needed when escort operations began in 2008, after more than ten years the PLAN has matured 
enough that it now seeks to optimize its far-seas escort operations. At least one Chinese analyst 
believes Djibouti could serve as a shore leave location, allowing deployment times to the Gulf of 
Aden to be extended by about 20 percent.214 The base has medical facilities, dormitories and athletic 
facilities that could provide improved rest and relief for naval personnel.215 While Djibouti’s 
inhospitable climate is not an ideal place for shore leave, base facilities may compare favorably to 
life aboard smaller surface combatants. A PLAN medical survey conducted on the 4th Escort Task 
Force reported high numbers of sailors suffering from mild to moderate depression despite measures 
taken to alleviate such effects, such as short-term shore leave.216 The need to sustain morale could 
explain the relatively frequent stops in Djibouti by PLAN frigates, since task forces include 
replenishment ships that should satisfy replenishment requirements and keep combat ships on station.    
Security is a big concern for PLAN forces when in port. Personnel on shore leave must undergo 
security and diplomatic briefings, and staff must carefully plan leave events ahead of time.217 Chinese 
reports also indicate concern over ship security when in close proximity to other international navies 
at the Djibouti old port. In December 2016, the 25th Escort Task Force reported sighting divers 
approaching a PLAN ship in port, accusing a Japanese naval ship moored nearby.218 The Djibouti 
Support Base provides a far more secure environment for PLAN forces operating in theater. A long-
term lease on the facility permits construction of underground or otherwise hardened facilities that 
better protect military personnel and assets. Once the naval pier becomes operational, fueling, 
replenishment, and shore leave will become even more secure. 
PLAN medical, logistics, and equipment support staff stationed on base began providing support to 
task forces immediately after opening in August 2017, starting with the 27th anti-piracy Escort Task 
Force’s stopover in Djibouti. Over the next year, it provided support and repair services involving 
nearly 1,000 parts to four escort task forces. 219 This underscores the ability of the base facilities to 
 
213 博文 [Bo Wen], 海外基地支持中国海军远洋护航升级 [“Overseas Bases Support Upgrade of Chinese Navy's Ocean 
Escort”], 现代舰船 [Modern Ships], no. 4 (January 15, 2019), p. 51. 
214 Ibid. 
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reporters the importance of having the base for shore relief of escort personnel. See 吉布提基地政委: 我海军护航编队将
转为以海外基地保障为主 [“Djibouti Base Political Commissar: Chinese Naval Escort Task Forces will Shift Over to 
Support Primarily from Overseas Bases”], 央视 [CCTV], December 27, 2018, https://www.guancha.cn/military-
affairs/2018_12_27_484806.shtml. 
216 The 4th Escort Task Force included two Type-054 frigates. 金昊 [Jin Hao], 吉布提: 人民解放军首个海外基地 
[“Djibouti: The PLA’s First Overseas Base”], 凤凰军事 [Phoenix News – Military], April 11, 2016, 
http://news.ifeng.com/a/20160411/48414276_0.shtml 
217 中国海军第九批护航编队 停靠吉布提补给休整 [“The Ninth Chinese Escort Task Force Stops at Djibouti for Rest 
and Replenishment”], 中新社-海南频道 [China News—Hainan], October 6, 2011, 
http://www.hi.chinanews.com/hnnew/2011-10-06/178791.html.  
218 日本蛙人侦察吉布提港中国军舰? 国防部: 我海军进行有效处置 [“Japanese Frogman Scouts Chinese Warship in 
Djibouti Port? Ministry of Defense: Our Navy Handled It Effectively”], 环球网 [Global Times], August 4, 2017, 
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1752605. 
219 “Djibouti Base Political Commissar: Chinese Naval Escort Task Forces will Shift Over to Support Primarily from 
Overseas Bases.”  
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store prepositioned key materials to supply PLAN forces operating in the region, such as armaments, 
equipment, and logistics materials needed for timely support for far-seas operations.220 In addition to 
naval forces, the base is well-positioned to support China’s large peacekeeping forces on the African 
continent (some 2,021, with 1,390 in east Africa), though no such support has been reported in open 
sources.221  
Intelligence Collection 
Protecting China’s overseas interests will require the PLA to anticipate and rapidly respond to 
emerging crises. There is little open discussion on this subject due to the sensitivity of intelligence 
matters, but the base will naturally facilitate early warning and intelligence gathering activities. PLA 
analysts note that intelligence collection is an important role for strategic strongpoints,222 and others 
cite the U.S. military’s facility at Diego Garcia is as a useful model.223 The base’s location in 
Djibouti is conducive to collect intelligence on other international military activities in Djibouti—
most significantly, U.S. AFRICOM’s Camp Lemonnier, the main hub for U.S. military operations in 
Africa. But the base’s position on the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait provides perhaps its most important 
intelligence function—a favorable vantage to observe military and commercial traffic through this 
important global chokepoint.    
HA/DR and Military Diplomacy 
The PLA has also highlighted the base’s ability to support regional humanitarian assistance and 
disaster response operations. Similarly, military diplomacy is quite visible in Djibouti. Prior to the 
construction of the base, PLAN escort task forces made a number of goodwill visits to local 
Djiboutian communities.224 The PLAN hospital ship Peace Ark visited Djibouti in 2010 and 2017, 
offering free medical care to local residents in order to foster political goodwill with Djibouti’s 
leadership and socialize the PLA’s in-country presence.225 Shortly after its opening, the base 
 
220 李守耕, 陈铁祺, 王丰 [Li Shougeng, Chen Tieqi, Wang Feng], 战备物资预置储备模式研究 [“On Preset Reserve 
Mode for Combat Readiness Material”], 军事交通学院学报 [Journal of Military Transportation University], no. 7 (July 
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221 United Nations, “United Nations Peacekeeping,” Data, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors. 
222 郑崇伟, 高占胜, 高成志 [Zheng Chongwei, Gao Zhansheng, Gao Chengzhi], 经略 “21世纪海上丝路”: 战略支撑点
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223 董珊珊 [Dong Shanshan], 中国在印度洋的海上通道安全和战略支撑点的建立 [“China's Maritime Passage Security 
in the Indian Ocean and the Construction of Strategic Strong Points”], 中国水运 [China Water Transport], no. 12 
(December 2015), pp. 51-52; 许可 [Xu Ke], 构建“海上丝路”上的战略支点 [“On the Establishment of Strategic 
Fulcrums for the ‘21st Century Maritime Silk Road’: A Reference of Diego Garcia Base for China”], 亚太安全与海洋研
究 [Asia-Pacific Security and Maritime Affairs], no. 5 (2016), p. 12. 
224 These included a number of visits to local elementary schools. For a few examples, see: 海军第八批护航编队慰问吉
布提小学 [“Eighth Naval Escort Task Force Greets Djibouti Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in 
Djibouti], May 13, 2011, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677704/1206x2_677724/t822350.shtml; 第九
批护航编队给小学赠送慰问品 [“Ninth Escort Task Force Donates Gifts to Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC 
Embassy in Djibouti], October 8, 2011, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t865663.htm; 海军第十一批护航编队给吉
小学赠送慰问品 [“Eleventh Naval Escort Task Force Donates Gifts to Djibouti Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆 
[PRC Embassy in Djibouti], June 9, 2012, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t939834.htm.  
225 跨越大洋的友谊  ‘和平方舟’ 号执行医疗服务记事 [“Friendship Across the Oceans, A Record of the ‘Peace Ark’s’ 
Medical Services”], 新华社 [Xinhua], November 26, 2010, http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2010-11/26/content_1754569.htm; 中
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provided medical materials to the Djiboutian Military Police. PLA sources have indicated that the 
base hospital will also provide medical services to the local Djiboutian people.226 In this capacity, the 
base launched “Bright Mission” in cooperation with Djiboutian health authorities in December 2019 
to provide cataract surgery to local citizens. The PLAN Second Military Medical University in 
Shanghai dispatched ten personnel to support this effort.227 The Chinese base also responded to a 
Djiboutian request to assist in a multinational effort to extinguish fires that broke out in Djibouti 
City’s landfill.228 
The base hospital provides opportunities for international military engagement. PLAN forces in 
Djibouti conducted their first joint exercise with a foreign military on April 25, 2018, when base 
personnel teamed up with Italian forces to conduct medical rescue exercises.229 They performed two 
more medical evacuation training exercises with the European Naval Forces in the Gulf of Aden in 
2018. The first involved responding to a merchant ship distress call and dispatching a team aboard an 
Italian frigate in Task Force 465. After rendering assistance, the exercise team returned to base on the 
frigate’s SH-90 helicopter with a patient in severe condition.230 In a second joint exercise, a Spanish 
amphibious ship focused on disaster relief, again dispatching medical personnel and coordinating 
foreign helicopter transport to the base’s medical facilities.231 
These “soft” functions continue the gradual socialization of China’s military presence in Djibouti, 
paving the way for incremental expansion over the coming years. Senior Chinese diplomats have 
already suggested, for instance, that Chinese troops could mediate border conflicts in the region.232 
While visiting Ethiopia in 2016, a high-level PLA delegation hinted at the military’s potential use of 
the vast PRC-built civilian infrastructure networks connecting the two African nations.233  
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In sum, the PRC’s base in Djibouti and growing military engagement in the wider region represent an 
important change in the PLA’s overseas posture. Given China’s economic commitment to the Horn 
of Africa, its growing political and military connections to Djibouti and Ethiopia, and the 
demonstrated capacity to quickly scale up port facilities, PLA exercises, trainings, and deployments 
in the region will likely increase significantly over time.  
Conclusion 
China’s growing engagement in Djibouti is a combined commercial and military undertaking to 
establish a strategic position for China in the western Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa. China’s 
comprehensive approach to first developing a commercial transport and logistics hub is characteristic 
of the strategic strongpoint model. Party-state priorities to access emerging markets and protect vital 
state and civilian interests in the region drive this process forward.  
Chinese firms have so far provided a robust platform for a wide-ranging PRC diplomatic, economic, 
and strategic presence in Djibouti, wrapped in the narrative promise of future local wealth through 
the “Shekou Model.” The consolidation of China’s strategic position in the western Indian Ocean and 
east Africa depends on complementary efforts to construct and operate road, rail, and pipeline 
infrastructure to connect inland markets and resources to the greater maritime economy. China 
appears to be counting on the success of its economic development efforts in the region to translate 
into a long-term military presence, with the strategic influence that comes with it. But how successful 
have these efforts been to date? 
Commercially, despite optimistic projections, China’s investments in Djibouti and Ethiopia have not 
lived up to the hype as yet. The changing political environment in Ethiopia, its diversification away 
from sole reliance on Djibouti’s ports, and a weakened global economy all serve as headwinds to 
making Djibouti and the greater Horn of Africa a successful example of the “Shekou Model.” That 
said, if the PRC is able to patiently play the long game, its commercial investments in this region 
with many promising attributes may well pay off over time. Further, China’s early investments give 
it an advantage over latecomers who will find themselves having to adjust to Chinese standards, 
practices, and influence already embedded in the region.  
Politically, China has developed a close relationship with the Djiboutian government, to the extent 
that Chinese entities are involved in government-like functions through the CMPort joint venture 
with the Djibouti port authority, and the treasury-like role of the Silk Road Investment Bank. This 
augments already-close PRC relations with the Guelleh family that sits at the top of Djibouti’s 
political structure. Through its naval diplomacy and other public relations measures, China seeks to 
portray itself as a positive force for the people of Djibouti, but it has clearly aimed its most important 
efforts at maximizing access to existing political power.  
Militarily, the completion of the strategic strongpoint with the construction of the naval base further 
augments Chinese power in Djibouti and in this strategically important part of the world. In China’s 
model, the military follows its economic investment. The base is becoming a useful asset for 
intelligence collection, regional power projection, and to sustain the PLA’s growing regional 
presence.234 The new base also marks a strategic shift in PLAN support methods for far-seas fleet 
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operations. The Djibouti Support Base political commissar explains the shift in these terms: “support 
methods for China’s far-seas escorts are gradually adjusting away from a focus on accompanying 
replenishment ships supplemented by mooring in foreign ports, into a new model focused on 
overseas base support supplemented by other ports abroad and domestic support.”235 Those overseas 
bases and “other ports abroad” are of critical importance to analysis of China’s growing military 
presence abroad. 
After all, this first strategic strongpoint is not designed to stand alone. By itself, the base is 
undefendable during conflict with another major power. From the PLA’s perspective, the lone base 
in Djibouti cannot be the only PLA safe harbor west of Fiery Cross Reef. More strategic strongpoints 
will need to be established to support China’s out of area operations. This suggests China will be 
looking to develop additional, mutually supporting strategic strongpoints that better connect the base 
in Djibouti to the bases in the Spratly Islands. Djibouti’s strategic value emerges as part of a network 
of strategic strongpoints spanning the Indian Ocean to support expanded Chinese trade and 
investment and to enable the PLA to better protect China’s growing portfolio of “overseas interests.”  
Looking ahead, the formal military base at Djibouti is probably not the model for how other Chinese 
strategic strongpoints will develop. The unique national status of Djibouti as host of several foreign 
militaries (most significantly, Japan) and the site of a multinational anti-piracy effort made the 
opportunity to set up a military base there an unusual opportunity. The remainder of the case studies 
in this series will examine other ports that fit the strategic strongpoint model and may form the 
backbone of the PLA’s expeditionary operations in the coming decades as China seeks expanding 
influence across the Indian Ocean region. 
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Appendix A. PLA Combat Training in Djibouti (2017-2018) 
 
Date Details of Combat Training 
22 Sep. 2017 First reported use of Djibouti’s national ranges. Dozens of troops aboard ZBL-08s traveled to 
the National Gendarmerie Training Range. Exercises included use of various small arms and 
vehicle mounted weapons. 
5 Nov. 2017 Series of exercises at an unknown location to mark the 19th National People’s Congress 
report. Involved combat realistic hostage rescue and live-fire exercises, as well as training in 
combat readiness patrols in full gear and emergency mobilization. 
23 Nov. 2017 Live-fire exercise with heavy weapons (two ZTL-11s and three ZBL-08s) at the Arta firing 
range. Combined assault maneuvers meant to test tactics and emergency response 
capabilities. Troops practiced with assault rifles, crew-served machine guns, sniper rifles, and 
vehicle-mounted weapons. 
9 Jan. 2018 Base organized an “all personnel tactical field march in full gear” to train the troops in 
conducting missions in volcanic desert conditions. Over the course of three days, three 
groups of personnel marched 15 km in full gear across uninhabited areas of the desert, 
encountering blue force harassment and overcoming challenges in combat, countering enemy 
surveillance aircraft, and pursuing terrorist threats on foot. 
12 May 2018 
 
Live-fire training involving ZBL-08 and ZTL-11 vehicles at the Arta firing range, focused on 
rapid maneuver combat and counter-terrorism response. Assault maneuvers, multi-pronged 
pursuit, coordinated light and heavy fires, and precision strikes against “terrorist” targets 
were conducted during this exercise. This exercise was reportedly conducted during the hot 
season to test the high-intensity limits of operational command, coordinated communications, 
logistics support, and equipment support. Troops deployed from the ZBL-08s also conducted 
ground combat tactical maneuvers. 
7 Jul. 2018 A combat readiness exercise was conducted to test the rapid response capabilities of the 
troops at the Djibouti Support Base. Troops were seen rapidly dismounting from their 
Mengshi vehicle in combat gear.  
PRC press ceased reporting on combat exercises in July 2018, but such exercises almost 
certainly continue to present.  
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Appendix B. PLAN Port Calls to Djibouti (2010-Present) 
 
Date Mission Vessel 
24 January 2010 4th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054 frigate Ma’anshan  
28 January 2010 4th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054 frigate Wenzhou  
10 February 2010 4th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Chaohu 
3 May 2010 5th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052B destroyer Guangzhou 
10 May 2010 5th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Chaohu 
23 August 2010 Friendly Visit Type-920 hospital ship Heping Fangzhou 
24 August 2010 6th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu 
13 September 2010 6th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-071 landing platform dock Kunlunshan 
20 September 2010 6th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Lanzhou 
13 December 2010 7th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Zhoushan 
20 December 2010 7th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Xuzhou 
21 February 2011 7th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Zhoushan 
29 March 2011 8th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu 
10 May 2011 8th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054 frigate Wenzhou 
15 May 2011 8th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054 frigate Ma’anshan 
6 October 2011 9th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052B destroyer Wuhan 
12 October 2011 9th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yulin 
19 October 2011 9th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-901 replenishment ship Qinghaihu 
1 January 2012 10th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yuncheng 
12 January 2012 10th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Haikou 
7 March 2012 10th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Haikou 
24 March 2012 11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu 
11 May 2012 11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yantai 
20 May 2012 Circumnavigation—Friendly Visit Type-679 training ship Zhenghe 
23 May 2012 11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu 
5 June 2012 11th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052 destroyer Qingdao 
13 August 2012 12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yiyang 
19 August 2012 12th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Changzhou 
1 December 2012 13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Huangshan 
8 December 2012 13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Hengyang 
14 December 2012 13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-901 replenishment ship Qinghaihu 
31 January 2013 13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Huangshan 
9 February 2013 13th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Hengyang 
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6 June 2013 14th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu 
25 July 2013 14th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin 
30 July 2013 14th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-053H3 frigate Mianyang 
7 October 2013 15th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-071 landing platform dock Jinggangshan 
14 October 2013 15th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu 
21 October 2013 15th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Hengshui 
22 February 2014 16th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-053H3 frigate Luoyang 
13 March 2014 16th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu 
1 April 2014 16th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yancheng 
30 June 2014 17th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Changchun 
5 July 2014 17th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Changzhou 
10 July 2014 17th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Chaohu 
30 July 2014 17th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Changchun 
8 September 2014 18th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-071 landing platform dock Changbaishan 
13 September 2014 18th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yuncheng 
3 November 2014 18th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-071 landing platform dock Changbaishan 
26 January 2015 19th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Linyi 
31 January 2015 19th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Weifang 
13 February 2015 19th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu 
30 March 2015 19th Anti-piracy Escort Task 
Force/NEO 
Type-054A frigate Linyi 
31 March 2015 19th Anti-piracy Escort Task 
Force/NEO 
Type-054A frigate Weifang 
1 June 2015 20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-051 destroyer Jinan 
7 June 2015 20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yiyang 
12 June 2015 20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu 
30 June 2015 20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-051 destroyer Jinan 
Mid-July 2015 20th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yiyang 
6 September 2015 21st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Liuzhou 
12 September 2015 21st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Sanya 
17 September 2015 21st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-901 replenishment ship Qinghaihu 
8 February 2016 22nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052 destroyer Qingdao 
6 April 2016 22nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu 
12 April 2016 22nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Daqing 
29 April 2016 23rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Zhoushan 
15 May 2016 23rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Xiangtan 
 43 
10 July 2016 23rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Zhoushan 
16 July 2016 23rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Chaohu 
3 October 2016 24th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052 destroyer Ha’erbin 
9 October 2016 24th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Handan 
15 October 2016 24th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Dongpinghu 
12 January 2017 25th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Hengyang 
Mid-March 2017 25th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Honghu 
22 March 2017 25th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yulin 
1 May 2017 26th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Huanggang 
7 May 2017 26th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yangzhou 
13 May 2017 26th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Gaoyouhu 
28 June 2017 Task Force 150–Long-distance 
Friendly Visit 
Type-052C destroyer Changchun, Type-054A 
frigate Jingzhou, Type-903A replenishment ship 
Chaohu  
1 August 2017 26th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force 
(base opening ceremony) 
Unclear - personnel from 26th Anti-piracy Escort 
Task Force present during base opening ceremony 
23 August 2017 Harmonious Mission-2017 Type-920 hospital ship Heping Fangzhou 
6 September 2017 27th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Haikou 
Mid-September 2017 27th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yueyang, Type-901 
replenishment ship Qinghaihu 
6 November 2017 27th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Haikou 
Mid-November 2017 27th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yueyang, Type-901 
replenishment ship Qinghaihu 
8 February 2018 28th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Taihu 
19 February 2018 28th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Yancheng 
25 February 2018 28th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Weifang 
14 May 2018 29th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Xuzhou 
20 May 2018 29th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Binzhou 
26 May 2018 29th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Qiandaohu 
9 September 2018 30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Wuhu 
14 September 2018 30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Handan 
19 September 2018 30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Dongpinghu 
10 November 2018 30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Wuhu 
16 November 2018 30th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Handan 
26 January 2019 31st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Xuchang 
20 February 2019 31st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Luomahu 
10 March 2019 31st Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-071 landing platform dock Kunlunshan 
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14 May 2019 32nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052C destroyer Xi’an 
22 May 2019 32nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Anyang 
21 July 2019 32nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Anyang 
26 July 2019 32nd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Gaoyouhu 
24 September 2019 33rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052D destroyer Xining 
30 September 2019 33rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-054A frigate Weifang 
6 October 2019 33rd Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903A replenishment ship Kekexilihu 
20 January 2020 34th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-903 replenishment ship Weishanhu 
25 January 2020 34th Anti-piracy Escort Task Force Type-052D destroyer Yinchuan 
Appendix B Sources:  “‘Ma’Anshan’ of the Chinese Navy Escort Task Force Arrives in Djibouti Port for Replenishment 
and Rest;” 海军护航编队‘温州’舰抵达吉布提港 [“Naval Escort Task Force ‘Wenzhou’ Arrives in Djibouti Port”], 驻吉布提使
馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 29, 2010, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t654689.htm; The FFG Chaohu joined 
the fourth escort task force earlier in late 2009. 中国海军护航编队 ‘巢湖’ 号抵达吉布提港补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort 
Task Force ‘Chaohu’ Arrives in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], 
February 10, 2010, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677704/1206x2_677724/t657510.shtml; 海军第五批
护航编队首次停靠非洲港口吉布提 [“Fifth Naval Escort Task Force Stops in the African Port of Djibouti for the First Time”], 
新华网 [Xinhua], May 4, 2010, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2010_05/04/1482421_0.shtml; 驻吉使馆经商处积极参与海
军第五批护航编队靠港后勤保障工作 [“The Economic and Commercial Office of the Embassy in Djibouti Participates in 
Logistic Support Work of the Fifth Naval Escort Task Force Stop in Port”], 驻吉经商参处 [Economic and Commercial Office in 
Djibouti], May 26, 2010, http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201005/20100506932117.shtml; 中国海军和平方舟医院船时隔
七年再访吉布提 [“Chinese Naval Hospital Ship Peace Ark Visits Djibouti Again After Seven Years”], 新华社 [Xinhua], August 
23, 2017, http://m.xinhuanet.com/2017-08/23/c_1121531941.htm; 海军护航编队 ‘微山湖号’ 抵达吉布提港 [“Naval Escort 
Task Force ‘Weishanhu’ Arrives in Djibouti Port”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], August 24, 2010, 
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/gjhdq_676201/gj_676203/fz_677316/1206_677704/1206x2_677724/t726542.shtml; 驻吉布提大
使张国庆率使馆及中资机构人员欢迎护航编队 “昆仑山” 号来吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing 
Leads Staff from Embassy and Chinese-funded Institutions to Welcome Escort Task Force ‘Kunlunshan’ to Djibouti for Rest and 
Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], September 13, 2010, http://dj.china-
embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t752046.htm; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率使馆及援吉医疗队人员欢迎护航编队 ‘兰州号’ 来吉补给休整 
[“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Embassy Staff and Medical Aid Team Personnel to Welcome Escort Task 
Force ‘Lanzhou’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], September 21, 2010, 
http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t754225.htm; 海军第七批护航编队舟山舰完成首次靠港休整补给 [“Seventh Naval 
Escort Task Force Ship Zhoushan Completes its First Stop in Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 凤凰军事 [Phoenix News 
Military], December 21, 2010, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2010_12/21/3613026_0.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率使馆
和中资机构人员欢迎护航编队 ‘舟山’ 号来吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Staff from 
Embassy and Chinese-funded Institutions to Welcome Escort Task Force ‘Zhoushan’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 
驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], December 13, 2010, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t777810.htm; 驻吉布提大
使张国庆率使馆和中资机构人员欢迎护航编队 ‘徐州’ 号来吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing 
Leads Staff from Embassy and Chinese-funded Institutions to Welcome ‘Xuzhou’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉
布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], December 20, 2010, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t779570.htm; The Libya NEO 
reportedly caused the Zhoushan to cancel leave and rest in Djibouti to take over escort operations for the Xuzhou FFG that was 
diverted to support the NEO operation. See ‘徐州’舰 26日已航行至红海北部海域为撤侨护航 [“Naval Ship ‘Xuzhou’ in the 
northern area of the Red Sea on the 26th to Escort Evacuated Overseas Chinese”], 中央政府门户网站 [Central Government 
Portal], February 26, 2011, http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2011-02/26/content_1811338.htm; 刘一伟, 唐诗峰 [Liu Yiwei, Tang 
Shifeng], “舟山”舰停靠吉布提休整补给 5天 中资机构欢迎 [“Naval Ship ‘Zhoushan’ Stops in Djibouti for Five-Day Rest and 
Replenishment, Welcomed by Chinese-funded Institutions”], 解放军报 [PLA Daily], February 25, 2011, 
http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2011_02/25/4851610_0.shtml; 海军护航编队 ‘千岛湖’ 号停靠吉布提港补给休整 [“Naval 
Escort Task Force ‘Qiandaohu’ Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], 
March 29, 2011, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t810533.htm; 海军第八批护航编队慰问吉小学 [“Eighth Naval Escort 
Task Force Visits Djibouti Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 13, 2011, http://dj.china-
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embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t822349.htm; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率队欢迎我护航编队 ‘马鞍山’号再次到吉 [“PRC Ambassador to 
Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Another Arrival by Chinese Escort Task Force ‘Ma’Anshan’”], 驻吉布提使馆 
[PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 16, 2011, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t822766.htm; 中国海军第九批护航编队 停靠
吉布提补给休整 [“Ninth Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 海南频道 
[Hi.Chinanews.com], October 6, 2011, http://www.hi.chinanews.com/hnnew/2011-10-06/178791.html; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率
队欢迎我第九批护航编队 ‘玉林号’ 到吉补给休整 [“PRC Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome 
Ninth Chinese Escort Task Force ‘Yulin’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 央视网 [CCTV], October 13, 2011, 
http://news.cntv.cn/20111013/117274.shtml; 驻吉布提使馆欢迎青海湖舰到吉休整补给 [“Embassy in Djibouti Welcomes 
Naval Ship Qinghaihu to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国领事服务网 [CS.MFA.GOV.CN], October 24, 2011, 
http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/zggmzhw/lsbh/lbxw/t870133.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆元旦率队欢迎我第十批护航编队运城舰到吉补
给休整 [“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team on New Year’s Day to Welcome Tenth Chinese Escort Task 
Force Ship ‘Yuncheng’ to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 1, 2012, 
http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t892146.htm; 海军 ‘海口’舰停靠吉布提进行第二轮补给休整 [“Naval Ship ‘Haikou’ 
Stops in Djibouti for Second Round of Rest and Replenishment”], 人民网 [People’s Daily Online], January 12, 2012, 
http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2012_01/13/11939836_0.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率队欢迎我第十批护航编队海口
舰到吉补给休整 [“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Tenth Chinese Escort Task Force Ship 
Haikou to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], January 12, 2012, http://dj.china-
embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t895007.htm; 海军第十批护航编队慰问吉布提小学 [“Tenth Naval Escort Task Force Visits Djibouti 
Elementary School”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], March 9, 2012, http://dj.china-
embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t912449.htm; 海军第十一批护航编队开始首轮靠港补给休整 [“Eleventh Naval Escort Task Force 
Begins First Round of In-Port Rest and Replenishment”], 中国军网 [China Military Online], March 25, 2012, 
http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2012_03/25/13430028_0.shtml; 驻吉中资机构欢迎我海军烟台舰到吉补给休整 [“Chinese-
funded Institutions Welcome Chinese Naval Ship Yantai to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆经商处 [PRC 
Embassy in Djibouti Economic and Commercial Office], May 11, 2012, 
http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201205/20120508119523.shtml; “郑和” 舰环球航行: 停靠吉布提补给休整 [“Naval Ship 
‘Zheng He’ Circumnavigation: Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中广军事 [China National Radio Military], May 
20, 2012, http://mil.cnr.cn/ztl/zhjhq/zxxx/201205/t20120520_509656458.html; 驻吉布提使馆欢迎海军第十一批护航编队微山
湖舰到吉补给休整 [“Embassy in Djibouti Welcomes Eleventh Naval Escort Task Force Ship Weishanhu to Djibouti for Rest 
and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], May 24, 2012, http://dj.china-
embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t934677.htm; 中国海军护航舰艇停靠吉布提港补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Stops 
in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], June 5, 2012, 
http://mil.cankaoxiaoxi.com/2012/0605/44947.shtml; 中国第 12批护航编队 ‘益阳’舰首次靠港补给休整 [“Twelfth Chinese 
Escort Task Force Ship ‘Yiyang’ In Port for Rest and Replenishment for the First Time”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], 
August 14, 2012, http://news.ifeng.com/mil/2/detail_2012_08/14/16787648_0.shtml; 驻吉中资机构欢迎我海军常州舰到吉补
给休整 [“Chinese-funded Institutions Welcome Chinese Naval Ship Changzhou to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 吉布
提经商处 [PRC Economic and Commercial Office in Djibouti], August 19, 2012, 
http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201208/20120808292252.shtml; 中国第 13批护航编队首次靠港补给 [“Thirteenth 
Chinese Escort Task Force Conducts In-Port Replenishment for First Time”], 人民网 [People’s Daily Online], December 3, 
2012, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2012_12/03/19780766_0.shtml; 驻吉中资机构欢迎我海军衡阳舰到吉补给休整 
[“Chinese-funded Institutions Welcome Chinese Naval Ship Hengyang to Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 吉布提经商处 
[PRC Economic and Commercial Office in Djibouti], December 8, 2012, 
http://dj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/jmxw/201212/20121208473286.shtml; 驻吉布提大使张国庆率队欢迎我护航海军青海湖舰到
吉补给休整 [“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Chinese Naval Escort Ship Qinghaihu to 
Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], December 14, 2012, http://dj.china-
embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t998175.htm; 驻吉布提大使张庆国率队欢迎我海军第十三批护航编队 570舰来吉补给休整 
[“Ambassador to Djibouti Zhang Guoqing Leads Team to Welcome Thirteenth Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship 570 to 
Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], February 3, 2013, 
http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/gyls/lsgz/lqbb/t1010571.shtml; 中国驻吉布提大使馆与中国海军第十三批护航编队 568舰共度新春佳节 
[“Chinese Embassy in Djibouti Celebrates Sprint Festival with Ship 568 of the Thirteenth Chinese Naval Escort Task Force”], 驻
吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], February 10, 2013, http://cs.mfa.gov.cn/gyls/lsgz/lqbb/t1013258.shtml; 中国海军第 14
批护航编队停靠吉布提港补给 [“14th Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 中
国广播网 [China National Radio], June 8, 2013, http://www.chinanews.com/mil/hd2011/2013/06-08/212040.shtml; 我海军哈尔
滨舰到吉布提补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Ship Ha’erbin Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC 
Embassy in Djibouti], July 25, 2013, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1061795.htm; 海军第十四批护航编队慰问吉布提
乒乓球协会 [“14th Naval Escort Task Force Visits Ping Pong Association in Djibouti”], 中华人民共和国外交部 [PRC Foreign 
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Ministry], July 30, 2013, https://china.huanqiu.com/article/9CaKrnJBzp9; 我海军绵阳舰到吉布提补给休整 [“Chinese Naval 
Ship Mianyang Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 30, 2013, 
http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1062686.htm; 我海军护航官兵与海外侨胞共同庆祝建军节 [“Chinese Naval Escort 
Troops Celebrate PLA Founding with Overseas Chinese Compatriots”], 中国海军 [Chinese Navy], August 3, 2013, 
http://navy.81.cn/content/2013-08/03/content_5428710.htm; 第十五批护航编队井冈山舰停靠吉布提开始第二轮补给 [“15th 
Escort Task Force Ship Jinggangshan Stops in Djibouti to Begin Second Round of Replenishment”], 中国海军 [China Navy], 
October 8, 2013, http://navy.81.cn/content/2013-10/08/content_5569719_4.htm; 我海军太湖舰到吉布提休整补给 [“Chinese 
Naval Ship Taihu Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], October 14, 
2013, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1089228.htm; 我海军护航编队衡水舰到吉布提休整补给 [“Chinese Escort Task 
Force Ship Hengshui Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], October 21, 
2013, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1091330.htm; 中国海军护航编队洛阳舰停靠吉布提港补给休整 [“Chinese Naval 
Escort Task Force Ship Luoyang Stops in Djibouti Port for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Online], 
February 22, 2014, http://news.ifeng.com/mainland/detail_2014_02/22/34083485_0.shtml; 建佳, 李秀林 [Jian Jia, Li Xiulin], 第
十六批护航编队太湖舰进行舰体安全探摸作业 [“16th Escort Task Force Ship Taihu Conducts Ship Safety Inspection Work”], 
中国海军网 [China Navy Online], March 15, 2014, http://navy.81.cn/content/2014-03/15/content_5812204_6.htm; 在护航中成
长 – 海军太湖舰入列一周年纪事 [“Growing Up in Escort Operations – Chronicling a Week of the Naval Ship Taihu”], 中国新
闻网 [China News Network], July 11, 2014, http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2014-07-11/202130506942.shtml; 李晓, 胡全福 [Li Xiao, 
Hu Quanfu], 海军第十六批护航编队盐城舰靠泊吉布提补给休整 [“16th Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yancheng Stops in 
Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Online], April 2, 2014, 
http://news.ifeng.com/a/20140402/40000508_0.shtml; 李晓, 胡全福 [Li Xiao, Hu Quanfu], 海军第十六批护航编队盐城舰靠泊
吉布提补给休整 [“16th Naval Escort Task Force Ship Yancheng Stops in Djibouti for Rest and Replenishment”], 中国军网 
[China Military Online], April 3, 2014, http://photo.81.cn/pla/2014-04/03/content_5838714.htm; 第 17批护航编队停靠吉布提
港开始第 3轮补给休整 [“17th Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti Port to Begin its Third Round of Rest and Replenishment”], 
中国海军网 [China Navy Online], June 30, 2014, http://ocean.china.com.cn/2014-06/30/content_32812555.htm; 我海军护航编
队常州舰到吉布提补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Changzhou Arrives in Djibouti for Rest and 
Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 5, 2014, http://dj.china-embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1171818.htm; 
我海军护航编队巢湖舰来吉补给休整 [“Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Ship Chaohu Comes to Djibouti for Rest and 
Replenishment”], 驻吉布提使馆 [PRC Embassy in Djibouti], July 11, 2014, http://dj.china-
embassy.org/chn/xwdt/t1173818.htm; 第 17批护航编队开始第 4轮靠港补给休整 [“17th Escort Task Force Begins Fourth 
Round of In-Port Rest and Replenishment”], 中国新闻网 [China News Network], July 31, 2014, 
http://military.people.com.cn/n/2014/0731/c1011-25374303.html; 中国海军第十八批护航编队首次停靠吉布提港 [“18th 
Chinese Naval Escort Task Force Stops in Djibouti for the First Time”], 中央政府门户网站 [Central Government Portal], 
September 9, 2014, http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-09/09/content_2747108.htm; 中国海军护航编队运城舰到吉布提补给休
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